Report of the Standing Committee on Implementation and Compliance (SCIC)

This is a preliminary version as adopted by SCIC on Friday, 22 October 2021\(^1\)

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\(^1\) Preliminary in this case means that further proofreading and verification is still to be done by the Secretariat.
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**Report of the Meeting of the Standing Committee on Implementation and Compliance (SCIC)**

**Opening of the meeting**

1. The Meeting of the Standing Committee on Implementation and Compliance (SCIC) was conducted virtually from 18 to 22 October 2021. Delegates were unable to be present in person in Hobart and participated in the meeting virtually through Interprefy.

2. The Chair of SCIC, Ms M. Engelke-Ros (United States of America (USA)), opened the meeting, welcomed Members and Observers, and thanked the Secretariat for its support. The Chair further expressed thanks to Members for their intersessional work to prepare for SCIC.

**Organisation of the meeting**

3. SCIC considered the SCIC agenda as adopted by the Commission.

**Review of compliance and implementation-related measures and systems**

4. SCIC considered the proposal by the Russian Federation (Russia) for a formalised reporting system for the retrieval of fishing gears after the closure of a fishery (CCAMLR-40/29).

5. SCIC thanked Russia for its paper, noting that the compilation of information relating to late gear retrieval notifications that had been reported in circulars was useful. The USA noted that it would be helpful if the Secretariat could compile similar information for SCIC to consider at its meetings going forward.

6. The People’s Republic of China (China) expressed concerns over the delayed retrieval and consequential over-catch, recalled that this has been a persistent issue for several years, and looked forward to having this issue resolved.

7. Some Members expressed their regret that the Secretariat’s recommendations on vessel monitoring system (VMS) and transhipment could not be agreed upon. Some Members found many of these recommendations very useful in improving these two important matters. Some Members appreciated the time and effort the Secretariat has put in the work to identify gaps and suggest improvements and hoped that the non-agreement this time would not discourage the Secretariat’s ongoing effort to identify room for improvements. The Republic of Korea (Korea) encouraged Members to work with the Secretariat on a voluntary basis to support these efforts. Korea hoped that next year SCIC can have more time and fuller discussions on the Secretariat’s working papers and recommendations to support the evolution of important monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) measures of CCAMLR for the better.
Catch Documentation Scheme for *Dissostichus* spp. (CDS)

8. SCIC noted its appreciation for the Secretariat’s report on the implementation of the Catch Documentation Scheme for *Dissostichus* spp. (CDS) and analysis (CCAMLR-40/BG/06). The paper was taken as read and no discussion was held by SCIC.

Vessel inspection

9. SCIC noted its appreciation for the Secretariat’s report on the implementation of port inspections (Conservation Measure (CM) 10-03) and the System of Inspection (CCAMLR-40/BG/04). The paper was taken as read and no discussion was held by SCIC.

VMS and vessel movement activity within the Convention Area

10. SCIC considered the Secretariat’s report on the implementation of the VMS (CCAMLR-40/17) which included four recommendations to improve the VMS and vessel movement activity management:

   (i) adoption of a buffer zone or other measure outside the Convention Area for the transmission of VMS data

   (ii) undertaking a trial of the automatic generation of vessel movement notifications from VMS data, with the results reported to CCAMLR-41

   (iii) adoption of an annex to CM 10-04 for Members to use when requesting VMS data for surveillance and/or inspection activities

   (iv) conducting a survey of the different VMS units and service providers in operation in the Convention Area and report back to SCIC in 2022.

11. SCIC noted that recommendation one, the adoption of a buffer zone or other measure, was not agreed. SCIC noted the concerns of some Members that the adoption of such a requirement would imply regulating outside the Convention Area which they cannot support.

12. Some Members supported recommendation two, an automated VMS movement notification trial. Several Members agreed to voluntarily participate in the pilot project; in their view, the trial does not replace any of the obligations of CM 10-04.

13. Recommendation three, the adoption of a new Annex A to CM 10-04, was not agreed. Some Members noted that a standardised form for VMS data requests for surveillance and/or inspection activities would improve efficiency for both the Secretariat and requesting Members. Some Members agreed that the template could be used on a voluntary basis by interested Members.
14. Recommendation four, a survey of Members’ VMS units and service providers, was not agreed. Some Members noted that a survey would assist the Secretariat in identifying VMS-unit and provider-specific issues in data reporting and participation. Some Members expressed their willingness to implement the recommendation on a voluntary basis.

15. Many Members noted that VMS and vessel movement activity was an important management measure and improvements to these systems would benefit Members and the effectiveness of the Secretariat.

16. SCIC thanked the Secretariat for its paper. Many Members expressed their disappointment at SCIC not being able to agree on all the Secretariat’s recommendations. Some Members further noted that they supported proposals that improve efficiencies and enable the Secretariat to undertake its functions more easily which will ultimately support the Commission in its endeavours. Those Members welcomed working with the Secretariat and all Members on this and similar proposals in the intersessional period to try to improve the effectiveness of CCAMLR conservation measures.

Promotion of compliance in CCAMLR

17. SCIC noted its appreciation for the submissions from the European Union (EU), suggesting improvements to fisheries management in CCAMLR (CCAMLR-40/BG/01) and New Zealand reporting on the aerial surveillance patrols undertaken in the Ross Sea during the 2020/21 season (CCAMLR-40/BG/22). The papers were taken as read and no discussion was held by SCIC.

Transhipment

18. SCIC thanked the Secretariat for the report on the implementation of the notification system of transhipment (CCAMLR-40/16) which included five recommendations. SCIC noted that consensus could not be reached on the five proposals. Many Members noted the large number of compliance issues relating to transhipment notifications contained in the Summary CCAMLR Compliance Report (CCAMLR-40/07, Annex 1) and considered that the recommendations from the Secretariat could facilitate and improve compliance. Many Members expressed their willingness to continue to work with the Secretariat on this proposal intersessionally.

19. China indicated that these recommendations involved both technical issues and legal issues and discussion should have taken place in the context of CM 10-09. Therefore, China suggested that, should specific text changes to CM 10-09 reflecting these recommendations be proposed, they would be of help for efficient discussion.

20. The EU noted that vessels flagged to EU Member States Lithuania and Cyprus are identified in Table 1 of the report on the implementation of the notification system of transhipment (CCAMLR-40/16) as vessels flagged to ‘non-Contracting Parties’ (NCPs). The EU noted that it has exclusive competence for the conservation of marine biological resources, which covers fisheries-related transhipment activities within the Convention Area and requested that this be reflected appropriately in the report.
21. Australia and Argentina noted that several EU Member States are not Contracting Parties to the Convention and that this is a sensitive issue for CCAMLR.

22. ASOC thanked the Secretariat for its report and expressed support for its recommendations, recalling Recommendation 12 of the Second CCAMLR Performance Review (CCAMLR-XXXVI/01) that identified transhipment regulation as a significant gap in CCAMLR’s compliance regime. ASOC also noted that the EU’s suggested improvements to fisheries management in CCAMLR (CCAMLR-40/BG/01) provide useful suggestions for further actions that CCAMLR could take. ASOC noted that, in its view, CCAMLR continues to lag behind other organisations with respect to transhipment and that it hopes this can change in the future.

Proposals for new and revised compliance-related conservation measures

Conservation Measure 10-05

23. SCIC noted the 871 issues of non-compliance with CM 10-05, paragraph 6, identified in the CCAMLR Compliance Evaluation Procedure (CCEP) Summary Report and analysis (CCAMLR-40/07 Rev. 1, Annex 1). Some Members noted that the issues reflected some confusion caused by inconsistency in the use of language between CM 10-05 and the e-CDS. SCIC considered the proposal by the United States of America (USA) to revise CM 10-05 to address the inconsistency.

Conservation Measure 26-01

24. SCIC considered the proposal by the EU to amend CM 26-01 to prohibit the dumping and discharge of garbage, poultry, sewage and offal throughout the Convention Area (CCAMLR-40/21), and to replace the concept of a ‘vessel fishing’ with the defined term ‘fishing vessel’ from CM 10-03.

25. The EU noted that the current conservation measure only prohibits dumping and discharge south of 60°S latitude, and that the proposal was consistent with the MARPOL 73/78 Convention and its annexes.

26. Russia considered that the proposed changes to the definition of a fishing vessel in CM 10-03 were more relevant to the competence of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and noted that the definition would include transport vessels, many of which are flagged to NCPs.

27. China highlighted the fact that CM 26-01 was revised just two years ago with an EU proposal and expressed concerns over frequent changes in this conservation measure. China referred to Article IX of the Convention, and asked the EU whether it has conducted an analysis of the conservation need for this proposal. In addition, China indicated the current IMO polar code is not applicable to fishing vessels.
28. Some Members welcomed the proposal, noting that it would increase the protection of Antarctic marine living resources and their habitats and that seabirds, in particular, would benefit from the proposed expansion of the prohibition on the discharge of poultry throughout the Convention Area.

29. Japan and Argentina, whilst supporting the principle of preventing pollution in the Convention Area, considered that the issue of marine pollution is under the competence of the IMO and that some of the proposed provisions are beyond the scope of what is currently required under MARPOL and its annexes. Japan considered that if the EU’s proposals were presented and endorsed by the IMO, it could support the amendments to the relevant CCAMLR conservation measures.

30. Some Members reaffirmed that it was within CCAMLR’s mandate to enhance environmental protections in the Convention Area and that adoption of protections stronger than what is currently required under relevant IMO instruments is appropriate, provided that such measures do not conflict with the requirement of MARPOL and its annexes. These Members supported the proposal to amend CM 26-01 accordingly, noting that it strengthens current measures.

31. ASOC supported the EU proposal to amend CM 26-01 as ASOC considered it particularly important to reduce pollution from fishing vessels. ASOC also noted that fishing gear is the main at-sea-based source of marine debris globally, and that in the Convention Area over a thousand kilometres of longline are estimated to be lost per year. This presents a significant risk to the marine environment. ASOC therefore thanked members of the Coalition of Legal Toothfish Operators (COLTO) that have been making efforts to retrieve lost gear and urged CCAMLR to make additional revisions to CM 26-01 to address gear loss and reduce marine plastic pollution.

32. China highlighted that CCAMLR has addressed the concerns raised by ASOC in relation to plastic pollution by having revised CM 26-01 in 2019.

Data reporting and observer requirements

33. SCIC considered the proposal by the EU to amend CMs 21-01, 21-02 and 23-05 (CCAMLR-40/22). The proposed changes were to specify in CM 21-01 that the presence of a scientific observer on board is required for new fisheries, and to specify in CM 21-02 that the scientific observers should be appointed in accordance with the Scheme of International Scientific Observation (SISO). The changes to CM 23-05 were to clarify that its data collection requirements apply only to activities of vessels that do not have on board a scientific observer appointed in accordance with the SISO.

34. Many Members supported the proposals to amend CMs 21-01 and 21-02, noting the greater consistency that it would provide for observer presence and reporting requirements on vessels in all CCAMLR fisheries.

35. Some Members noted that CM 21-01 sets the requirements for a new fishery, that these require strict data collection plans, and that there have been no new CCAMLR fisheries
proposed for many years, therefore amendments to the conservation measure were not required. Some Members further considered that the addition of a SISO-appointed observer to CM 21-01 should only be considered after advice from the Scientific Committee.

36. Many Members noted that the proposal to amend CM 23-05 may undermine compliance. Furthermore, as observers are only required to collect a fraction of the information required within this conservation measure, the data collected by vessels can be important in the scientific process, as well as allow for cross-checking of reported information.

Recommendations of SCIC

37. SCIC thanked the EU for its proposal to amend CMs 21-01, 21-02 and 23-05 but was unable to reach consensus. SCIC invited interested Members to have intersessional discussions.

38. SCIC thanked the EU for its proposal to amend CM 26-01 but was unable to reach consensus on the proposal. Noting the need for further dialogue among Members, SCIC referred the matter to the Commission.

39. SCIC endorsed the proposal by the USA to amend CM 10-05, and the proposal by Russia to amend CM 31-02, and referred the proposals to the Commission for adoption.

CCAMLR Compliance Evaluation Procedure (CCEP)

Provisional CCAMLR Compliance Report

40. In accordance with CM 10-10, paragraph 3(i), SCIC considered the 77 potential compliance incidents in the CCEP Summary Report (CCAMLR-40/07, Annex 1). The procedure for generating the CCEP was circulated via COMM CIRC 21/80 and included in CCAMLR-40/07 as Annex 2. SCIC noted the overall high level of compliance with the conservation measures assessed, with compliance rates greater than 92% in most assessments.

41. China noted the reference to the SISO observer reports included in CCAMLR-40/07, Annex 2, needed some changes. SCIC concurred that whilst the mandate of SISO observers is to collect scientific data rather than to serve a compliance function, information contained in observer reports may be used by the Secretariat to identify potential compliance issues. SCIC agreed to modify the report on the CCEP methodology accordingly.

42. SCIC did not come to a conclusion on all matters in the Summary CCAMLR Compliance Report or reach consensus to adopt the Provisional CCAMLR Compliance Report as required in accordance with paragraph 3 of CM 10-10. Therefore, paragraphs 43 to 90 and the table in Appendix I reflect only the discussions as they proceeded as it was not possible to complete the full discussion on all matters. It was acknowledged that consensus would still need to be achieved on the report as a whole and that, because it is necessary to treat compliance issues consistently, some adjustments might have been needed prior to adoption of a Provisional CCAMLR Compliance Report.
Conservation Measure (CM) 10-01

43. SCIC considered the implementation of CM 10-01 by Korea regarding the marking of fishing vessels and gear. SCIC agreed the preliminary compliance status of minor non-compliant (Level 1) and noted the action taken by Korea to prevent future incidents.

CM 10-03, paragraph 4

44. SCIC considered the implementation of CM 10-03, paragraph 4, by Korea and Russia regarding the requirement for vessels to provide the information in CM 10-03, Annex 10-03/A, at least 48 hours in advance of port entry.

45. Some Members noted that, in accordance with paragraph 4 of CM 10-03, the Contracting Parties shall require vessels seeking entry into ports to provide 48-hour advance notice of arrival. In this regard, those Members considered the obligation in CM 10-03, paragraph 4, refers to the Port State.

46. China expressed concern with the inclusion of these issues in the Summary CCAMLR Compliance Report as instances of potential Flag State non-compliance, indicating the inconsistencies between instances included in the Summary CCAMLR Compliance Report. China further highlighted that the Flag State’s willingness to take responsibility, which is exception, does not exempt the concerned Port State from discharging its obligations and admitted the instance as a non-compliance case.

47. Many Members noted that whilst the obligation to implement a 48-hour advance notice of arrival requirement is a Port State obligation under CM 10-03, paragraph 4, implementation of the measures is only possible if the Flag State ensures that its vessels provide information to the Port State in a timely fashion. Those Members considered that intersessional work should be undertaken to review CM 10-03 and identify any required amendments to clarify the operation of the obligations in CM 10-03, particularly paragraph 4, on Flag States.

48. SCIC did not consider the compliance statuses for these particular issues involving CM 10-03 due to time constraints.

CM 10-03, paragraph 5

49. SCIC considered the implementation of CM 10-03, paragraph 5, by New Zealand, South Africa and Uruguay regarding the requirement for a port inspection to be conducted within 48 hours of port entry. SCIC agreed the preliminary compliance status proposed by all three Members.

50. The USA noted that the issue of late port inspections by South Africa has been an issue historically (CCAMLR-38, Annex 6, paragraphs 73 and 74) and regarded the matter with concern. The USA requested that South Africa provide an update to SCIC in 2022 on any efforts to improve port inspection capacity.
51. SCIC agreed the preliminary compliance status of minor non-compliant (Level 1) for this issue.

CM 10-03, paragraph 8

52. SCIC considered the implementation of CM 10-03, paragraph 8, by France and Mauritius regarding the submission of a port inspection report within 30 days following the inspection.

53. SCIC agreed the preliminary compliance status proposed by France. SCIC noted that Mauritius had not provided a preliminary compliance status and assigned a status of minor non-compliant (Level 1).

CM 10-04

54. SCIC considered the implementation of CM 10-04, paragraph 13, by seven Members regarding the requirement of Flag States to notify the Secretariat within 24 hours of each entry to, exit from, and movement between, subareas and divisions of the Convention Area.

55. SCIC was unable to reach consensus on compliance status for two vessels from China but for the remaining incidents, SCIC agreed with the preliminary status assigned by Australia, China, France, Korea, New Zealand, South Africa and Ukraine.

56. Australia noted the proposal set out in CCAMLR-40/17 to trial automatic generation of movement notifications and noted that implementation of this proposal would address many of the issues raised and improve compliance with conservation measures moving forward.

CM 10-05, paragraph 3

57. SCIC considered the implementation of CM 10-05, paragraph 3, by Uruguay regarding the requirement that each landing of Dissostichus spp. at its ports be accompanied by a completed Dissostichus Catch Document (DCD). SCIC agreed the preliminary compliance status proposed by Uruguay.

CM 10-05, paragraph 6

58. SCIC considered the implementation of CM 10-05, paragraph 6, by 13 Contracting Parties regarding the prohibition on exporting toothfish without an accompanying Dissostichus Export Document (DED) or Dissostichus Re-Export Document (DRED).

59. Some Members noted that many of the compliance issues related to this obligation arose from confusion between the requirement for a date of issue specified in CM 10-05,
Annex 10-05/A, paragraph A7(ix) and the date of export specified on the e-CDS. SCIC welcomed the Secretariat’s explanation of the issue and the proposal from the USA to amend CM 10-05 and the e-CDS to resolve any confusion.

60. SCIC noted Argentina’s statement that it had inadvertently omitted to respond to its draft compliance report. Argentina further recalled its response which was provided in COMM CIRC 21/115. SCIC agreed the proposed compliance status of compliant noting the issue was due to a typographical error made in completing the DED.

61. Australia noted the USA suggestion as stated in CCAMLR-40/BG/26 of a compliance status of minor non-compliant (Level 1) for its incident under CM 10-05, paragraph 6, in its draft compliance report, and emphasised the importance of consistency in assigning compliance statuses. SCIC agreed the compliance status of minor non-compliant (Level 1).

62. SCIC noted that Belgium did not provide a response to its draft compliance report and recalled the response provided by the EU on behalf of Belgium in CCAMLR-40/BG/26, paragraph 8. The EU informed that this issue of non-compliance was a result of an export of toothfish leaving Belgium whilst the United Kingdom (UK) was a Member of the EU and arriving in the UK after the exit by the UK from the EU, therefore requiring a DRED for the toothfish to be imported into the UK. Some Members considered that a compliance status of no status assigned could be applied as the issue was due to an exceptional set of circumstances that were unlikely to be repeated. SCIC did not agree on an assigned compliance status for Belgium.

63. Some Members noted that SCIC should consider the circumstance relating to nil response regarding this particular case concerning Belgium.

64. Russia noted that Chile validated 377 DED/DREDs after the declared export date, which accounted for 23% of Chile’s exports, and sought clarity on the administrative oversight that occurred. Chile confirmed that the majority of cases occurred in one region of the country and was due to administrative errors in the implementation of CM 10-05, including confusion over the date of issue and the export date in CM 10-05, paragraph A7(ix)(1)(d). Chile also expressed that remedial action had been taken to avoid future errors of administrative nature. SCIC did not agree on an assigned compliance status for Chile.

65. The EU considered that the preliminary assigned compliance status by China of compliant should be either minor non-compliant (Level 1) or need for interpretation by SCIC. SCIC did not agree on an assigned compliance status for China.

66. SCIC considered the compliance status assigned by France, noting that the issue was due to the interpretation of date of issue in CM 10-05, paragraph A7(ix)(1)(d). SCIC did not agree on an assigned compliance status for France.

67. SCIC noted that Mauritius had not assigned a preliminary compliance status and assigned a status of additional information required.

68. SCIC noted that the Netherlands did not provide a response to its draft compliance report and recalled the response provided by the EU on behalf of the Netherlands in CCAMLR-40/BG/26, paragraph 15. SCIC agreed to assign the Netherlands a status of additional information required.
69. Some Members noted that SCIC should consider the circumstance relating to nil response regarding this particular case concerning the Netherlands.

70. SCIC agreed the preliminary compliance status assigned by New Zealand, South Africa, UK, USA and Uruguay.

71. SCIC noted that Spain did not provide a response to its draft compliance report and recalled the response provided by the EU on behalf of Spain in CCAMLR-40/BG/26, paragraph 18. SCIC did not agree on an assigned compliance status for Spain.

72. Some Members noted that SCIC should consider the circumstance relating to nil response regarding this particular case concerning Spain.

CM 10-09, paragraph 2

73. SCIC considered four Members’ implementation of CM 10-09, paragraph 2, which requires each Contracting Party as a Flag State to notify the Secretariat at least 72 hours in advance if any of its vessels intend to transship within the Convention Area.

74. SCIC agreed the preliminary compliance status assigned by Chile and Norway.

75. SCIC noted that the Netherlands did not provide a response to its draft compliance report and recalled the response provided by the EU on behalf of the Netherlands in CCAMLR-40/BG/26, paragraph 15. SCIC assigned the Netherlands a status of minor non-compliant (Level 1).

76. Some Members noted that SCIC should consider the circumstance relating to nil response regarding this particular case concerning the Netherlands.

77. Some Members raised concerns with the preliminary status of ‘compliance’ provided by China. China noted that the issues were due to operational difficulties necessitating a change in the transhipment date and considered that updated information had been provided to the Secretariat. SCIC did not agree on an assigned compliance status for China.

78. SCIC did not consider the compliance of Panama, Russia, Ukraine and Vanuatu with CM 10-09, paragraph 2.

CM 10-09, paragraph 3

79. SCIC considered the implementation of CM 10-09, paragraph 3, by China, the Netherlands and Norway. This paragraph requires each Contracting Party to notify the Secretariat at least 2 hours in advance if any of its vessels intend to transship items other than harvested marine living resources, bait or fuel within the Convention Area.

80. SCIC agreed to assign a status of no compliance status assigned for China’s instances involving cases of emergency relating to the safety of a ship and those on board as consistent with the previous years’ practice.
81. SCIC noted that the Netherlands had not assigned a preliminary compliance status and recalled the response provided by the EU on behalf of Netherlands in CCAMLR-40/BG/26, paragraph 15, and agreed to assign a status of minor non-compliant (Level 1). SCIC agreed the preliminary compliance status of non-compliant (Level 2) for Norway.

82. Some Members noted that SCIC should consider the circumstance relating to nil responses regarding this particular case concerning the Netherlands.

83. SCIC did not consider the compliance of Panama and Vanuatu with CM 10-09, paragraph 3.

84. SCIC did not consider the compliance of Russia with CM 10-09, paragraph 4.

85. SCIC considered the implementation of CM 10-09, paragraph 5, by five Members. This paragraph requires each Contracting Party to provide confirmation of transhipment to the Secretariat within three (3) working days of any of its vessels having transhipped within the Convention Area.

86. SCIC agreed the preliminary compliance status assigned by Chile, China and Norway. SCIC agreed a status of minor non-compliant (Level 1) for the Netherlands. SCIC agreed with Korea’s revised compliance status as provided in CCAMLR-40/BG/26, Annex 1. Due to time constraints, SCIC did not consider the compliance of Panama, Russia and Vanuatu with CM 10-09, paragraph 5.

87. SCIC considered the implementation of CM 10-09, paragraph 8, by Norway, which states that no vessel may conduct transhipment within the Convention Area for which prior notification, pursuant to CM 10-09, paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, has not been given.

88. SCIC agreed the preliminary compliance status assigned by Norway.

89. SCIC did not consider the compliance of Panama, Russia and Vanuatu with CM 10-09, paragraph 8.
Compliance issues not considered

90. SCIC did not consider the compliance issues with the following conservation measures and Members:

(i) CM 25-02: Ukraine, UK
(ii) CM 25-03: Chile
(iii) CM 26-01: China
(iv) CM 31-02: Ukraine
(v) CM 32-02: South Africa
(vi) CM 41-01: New Zealand,
(vii) CM 91-05: Korea, Spain, Ukraine, UK
(viii) System of Inspection: Norway.

Review of CM 10-10

91. SCIC noted that consensus decision-making is a fundamental element of CCAMLR’s Rules of Procedure and agreed that there are broad interests in reviewing the mechanisms of compliance evaluation, and how a compliance status is determined, but due to the limited time of the meeting, discussions on improvements to CM 10-10 could not be undertaken. Some Members recommended intersessional work be undertaken by interested Members, and Korea volunteered to chair e-group discussions on the issue.

92. SCIC agreed that compliance with conservation measures is essential to achieve the objective of the Convention and noted that the key objectives of the CCEP are to assess the effectiveness of conservation measures, to further strengthen conservation measures and improve overall compliance. Many Members expressed disappointment that there was no consensus to continue these important discussions on compliance issues resulting in the failure to adopt a Provisional CCAMLR Compliance Report.

93. Many Members noted that SCIC should always be focused on building a positive compliance process focused on follow-up actions where there is a need to resolve issues. In this regard, Australia noted its paper from 2018 (CCAMLR-XXXVII/BG/39) outlining its views on the principles of the CCEP.

94. China expressed its disappointment with the failure to adopt a Provisional CCAMLR Compliance Report, recalling that in 2020 the Commission last underscored the importance of following procedures set out in CM 10-10 to adopt the Provisional CCAMLR Compliance Report this year (CCAMLR-39, paragraph 3.42). To improve the situation, China suggested separating technical issues from the legal and compliance issues in both drafting and reviewing the report. China considered that SCIC should allocate more time for the review of the Summary CCAMLR Compliance Report and take this item as its first priority. In addition, China encouraged Members to focus more attention on the implementation of the conservation measures, including CM 10-10.

95. SCIC reflected that overall compliance with CCAMLR conservation measures is very high (CCAMLR-40/07, paragraph 6i) and noted that the process of consensus requires active engagement not just during the SCIC meeting. The UK encouraged all Members to participate intersessionally to improve the process of providing consensus decisions and advice.
96. Russia noted its support for consensus principles in adopting the summary compliance report and noted that supporting subsidiary bodies is a matter for the Commission to create and designate terms of reference for. Russia further noted that for any subsidiary group, there needs to be agreement on what is being discussed to ensure advice was clear and consistent with formal mechanisms.

97. Many Members expressed their disappointment with the failure to adopt the Provisional CCAMLR Compliance Report for consideration by the Commission and welcomed proposed intersessional work to revise and improve the effectiveness of the CCEP process and CM 10-10.

98. ASOC supported the statements made by many Members reiterating that the CCEP’s successful functioning is absolutely essential to CCAMLR achieving its conservation objective. ASOC noted its concern about the outcome of this year’s process and suggested that Members work intersessionally to improve this situation. ASOC stated that avoiding a repeat of this year must be a priority ahead of next year’s SCIC meeting.

Illega, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing in Convention Area

Current level of IUU fishing

99. The Secretariat introduced CCAMLR-40/06 on illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing activity and trends in 2020/21 and IUU Vessel Lists. SCIC noted that no sightings of vessels included on the Contracting Parties and NCP-IUU Vessel Lists were reported during the 2020/21 season. SCIC also noted that there were 24 reports of unidentified fishing gear retrieved within the Convention Area for the period October 2020 to August 2021.

100. SCIC noted the interim report submitted by INTERPOL (CCAMLR-40/BG/07) in accordance with the funding agreement between CCAMLR and INTERPOL. Australia highlighted the considerable international effort with respect to the IUU fishing vessel Cobija. Australia further acknowledged the ongoing investigation by Spain and offered its continued support. India noted that this cooperation with INTERPOL is important in the efforts to combat IUU fishing activities. SCIC acknowledged the global effort undertaken by INTERPOL, Australia, Myanmar, Bolivia, Panama and Yemen in the boarding, investigation and apprehension of the vessel Cobija.

101. SCIC noted the New Zealand summary of information regarding the activities of the Russian-flagged fishing vessel Palmer in the Convention Area in January 2020 and November 2017 (CCAMLR-40/BG/21).

102. Russia noted that the required information had been provided in COMM CIRCs 20/76 and 20/135 and that it had reached out to New Zealand numerous times to request the original photographs of the Palmer which contain the raw metadata, but that had not been provided. Russia noted that, without these photographs, it has been significantly difficult to undertake further investigations. Russia noted it was willing to proceed further on the issue if the requested images could be provided.

103. New Zealand noted that CCAMLR-40/BG/21 summarised the information that has been tabled to date in support of Russia’s investigations regarding activities in January 2020 that led to New Zealand’s recommendation to include the Palmer on the CP-IUU Vessel List, and
further investigation of the 2017 pre-season fishing activities. New Zealand recalled that it has provided full and detailed information in support of these investigations (COMM CIRCs 20/47 and 20/149) and that the original photographs had been provided to Russia with copies to the Secretariat.

104. New Zealand and the USA noted the following outstanding information related to the activities of the Palmer including: verifiable VMS data, C2 catch data and observer reporting data for the month of January 2020, as well as confirmation that the Palmer continuously reported on VMS during the month of January 2020; and verifiable VMS data, C2 catch data, and observer reporting data, including photographs of the fishing gear on board from 18 to 30 November 2017.

105. Russia reiterated that the EXIF metadata of the photographs provided by New Zealand through the Secretariat was changed before being handed over to Russia and the submission of primary photographs with the original (raw) metadata is still necessary.

106. Many Members thanked New Zealand for the summary of information, noting that the C2 data, observer reports and verifiable VMS positions requested by SCIC have not been provided by Russia. SCIC welcomed the commitment of Russia and other interested parties to future engagement on the issue. Some Members noted that there was no reason to doubt the quality of information provided by New Zealand. The USA also noted that without resolution on the issue it may be necessary to quarantine the Palmer’s data from the stock assessment process.

107. SCIC noted the UK report to CCAMLR on possible IUU fishing in the Convention Area (CCAMLR-40/BG-17) identified through satellite surveillance activity in Subareas 48.1 and 48.3, which it has undertaken last season on behalf of CCAMLR. The suspected vessel(s) could not be identified through CCAMLR or engagement with the International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators (IAATO) and the Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs (COMNAP). The UK therefore undertook two aerial patrols in Subareas 48.1 and 48.3 and confirmed no authorised CCAMLR vessels or potentially illegal vessels had been detected.

108. China appreciated the efforts of the UK in conducting the surveillance activity on behalf of CCAMLR, was of the view that the Secretariat should be informed before and after the surveillance activities, and suggested that relevant protocols for such the surveillance activities be developed.

109. SCIC expressed gratitude to all Members who carry out patrols, noting that they provide a service to all CCAMLR Members through the work that they do.

110. ASOC thanked New Zealand, the UK and INTERPOL for their respective reports and looked forward to the report on the Palmer.

IUU Vessel Lists

111. SCIC considered the 2021/22 Provisional NCP-IUU Vessel List and the 2021/22 Provisional CP-IUU Vessel List.
SCIC noted the information distributed by Panama in COMM CIRCs 21/05 and 21/14 and agreed to move the *Nika* from the CP-IUU Vessel List to the NCP-IUU Vessel List. SCIC recalled COMM CIRC 21/78, noting that the *Baroon* was no longer registered by Tanzania and also noted the report by the Secretariat in CCAMLR-40/06 indicating that the *Asian Warrior* is not registered by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. SCIC agreed to amend the NCP-IUU Vessel List accordingly.

113. The Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) informed SCIC that it is a member of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) and as such has always adhered to the rules and regulations for responsible fishing and is committed to cooperation in addressing IUU fishing. With regard to the *Koosha 4*, Iran noted that at the time of the incident which led to the IUU listing, the vessel was under the management of a Spanish company. Iran reported that this management was terminated by direction of the Iranian government on discovery of the IUU fishing activities. In 2012, the vessel was confiscated by a bank due to a bankruptcy claim and removed from the IOTC active vessel list in 2017. The vessel has since fallen into great disrepair and has gone to auction three times but has not been sold due to its poor condition. The vessel has been inactive for more than six years. As such, Iran has requested the *Koosha 4* be removed from the NCP-IUU Vessel List.

114. SCIC noted that the removal of the *Koosha 4* from the NCP-IUU Vessel List was discussed in 2017 (CCAMLR-XXXVI, paragraph 3.53). SCIC requested written documentation and evidence to support the request for delisting, however, Iran indicated it would be at least two weeks until the requested documentation could be translated and made available. SCIC noted the information provided by Iran and decided that due to lack of written documentation and supporting evidence, the *Koosha 4* should remain on the NCP-IUU Vessel List. SCIC agreed to recommend that the Commission consider making an intersessional decision on the removal of the *Koosha 4* from the NCP-IUU Vessel List if the documentation provided by Iran meets the criteria for delisting under CM 10-07, in particular paragraph 18, and consensus can be reached in the intersessional period pursuant to Rule 7 of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure. SCIC decided that the deadline for Iran to submit written documents is 30 days from the end of the CCAMLR meeting. SCIC requested the Secretariat to inform Iran the outcome of any Rule 7 process.

115. The proposed 2021/22 NCP-IUU Vessel List with the inclusion of the *Nika* and the changes to the registrations of the *Baroon* and the *Asian Warrior*, as agreed by SCIC, is provided in Appendix II for adoption by the Commission.

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**CP-IUU Vessel List**

116. SCIC considered the 2021/22 Provisional CP-IUU Vessel List and noted that the South African-flagged *El Shaddai* was included on that list, based on information that the vessel fished in Subarea 58.7 outside the South African exclusive economic zone (EEZ) during 2015 and 2016 as outlined in COMM CIRC 21/92.

117. South Africa recalled its response in COMM CIRC 21/93 and noted that a formal investigation is currently underway, including a criminal investigation into the conduct of the
master and the operator, but that the investigation has not been finalised. South Africa noted it is treating the allegations very seriously and that it will report the findings of the investigation once it is complete.

118. The EU cited its serious concern with the information provided in COMM CIRC 21/93, in particular that the vessel representatives were shocked and unaware of the activities as reported to CCAMLR. The EU recalled that it is the vessel’s responsibility to know where it operates and noted that the same vessel was discovered to have fished in the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA) area in 2019 for 67 days, catching 66 tonnes of toothfish without authorisation by SIOFA. The EU requested further information from South Africa about its investigation into the vessel’s activities, including the review of VMS data and catch records, and the measures it had taken as a Flag State to avoid such situations recurring.

119. SCIC expressed concern regarding the seriousness of the conduct of the *El Shaddai* and welcomed the information from South Africa about the status of the pending investigation and its commitment to provide additional information as soon as the investigation is complete.

120. SCIC agreed to include the *El Shaddai* on the Proposed 2021/22 CP-IUU Vessel List. The proposed 2021/22 CP-IUU Vessel List, as adopted by SCIC, is provided in Appendix III for approval by the Commission.

121. SCIC agreed to recommend that the Commission consider making an intersessional decision on the removal of the *El Shaddai* from the CP-IUU Vessel List if the information provided by South Africa meets the criteria for delisting under CM 10-06, in particular paragraph 14, and consensus can be reached in the intersessional period pursuant to Rule 7 of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure.

122. ASOC thanked South Africa for its flexibility in the discussion of the *El Shaddai* and supported the advice of SCIC for the vessel to be included on the CP-IUU Vessel List. ASOC noted that this is a serious issue and that, as a responsible Flag State, South Africa should not permit the *El Shaddai* to undertake future fishing activities until these issues have been resolved.

**Fishery notifications**

123. SCIC noted the Secretariat’s report on fishery notifications for 2021/22 (CCAMLR-40/BG/03 Rev. 1). The paper was taken as read and no discussion was held by SCIC.

**Advice from the Scientific Committee to SCIC**

124. SCIC considered advice from the Chair of the Scientific Committee (Dr D. Welsford (Australia)) in respect of green-weight estimation by vessels operating in the krill fishery. The Chair of the Scientific Committee noted that the Secretariat had undertaken an analysis of estimated green-weight reported by vessels and conversions factors, and could not reconcile parameters with reported catch values for the vessels *Juvel* and *Betanzos* for the 2013/14 and 2014/15 seasons (WG-EMM-2021/16).
125. SCIC noted that the Scientific Committee had tasked the Secretariat to engage with Norway and Chile intersessionally to potentially resolve the catch reporting issues and requested the Chair of the Scientific Committee report to SCIC in 2022 on the issue if required (SC-CAMLR-40, paragraph 9.1).

126. SCIC thanked the Chair of the Scientific Committee for his time.

**Other business**

127. The Secretariat presented the CDS Fund expenditure proposal (CCAMLR-40/14) for consideration by the CDS Fund Review Panel and SCIC. The request included three proposals for a combined cost of A$340,000 over two years (2022 and 2023).

128. SCIC noted the requirement of CM 10-05, Annex 10-05/B, for the designation of six Members to serve on a Review Panel to review the CDS Fund expenditure proposals (CCAMLR-40/14) and to make recommendations to the Commission on whether to fund special projects or special needs. The Chair received nominations from Argentina, Australia, Korea, New Zealand, UK and USA.

129. The CDS Fund Review Panel recommended the expenditure from the e-CDS fund totalling A$340,000 over two years (2022 and 2023) in support of the following proposals:

   (i) A CDS workshop, with a value of A$100,000, due to take place in South Africa but postponed due to the outbreak of the global pandemic. The Panel agreed that the workshop scope would continue to include port inspections for the purposes of CDS verification.

   (ii) Online CDS training workshops, with a value of A$40,000 (three workshops across the Americas, Europe, Africa, Asia and Oceania). The Panel requested that training modules be available on the CCAMLR website for officials who are unable to attend these workshops.

   (iii) An e-CDS system upgrade, with a value of A$200,000 over two years. The Secretariat confirmed that there would be extensive engagement with Members to ensure improvement of the user experience during the first year, as well as ongoing discussions around the authentication process. The Panel also confirmed that the user management regime with regard to the ‘sub-parties’ category should be considered on a case-by-case basis, with Member’s consensus.

130. SCIC thanked the CDS Fund Review Panel for its work and endorsed the three expenditure proposals. SCIC noted that additional financial details related to the e-CDS system upgrade proposal should be provided to, and considered by, the Standing Committee on Administration and Finance (SCAF).

131. China noted that the online e-CDS training was undertaken by its CDS users in June 2020 with participation of the Secretariat and thanked the Secretariat for its contribution.

132. The EU and Korea requested that updates to the e-CDS system are discussed with the CDS Technical Working Group to identify priority issues, to assess the impact of any changes
in the e-CDS system for users, and to avoid technical difficulties and disruption to the e-CDS system. They also requested that following the implementation of the e-CDS updates, workshops be conducted with CDS users and requested that any reference material for the online CDS workshops be made available on the CCAMLR website permanently.

133. The Secretariat presented an overview of compliance activity funding (CCAMLR-40/15) which included funding from the EU to support the development of the Secretariat’s compliance analysis capability. The Secretariat also requested expenditure of A$33,425 from the Compliance Fund to support Secretariat participation in an MCS workshop in 2022 or 2023 at the invitation of Chile. SCIC endorsed the requested expenditure and noted that the Secretariat should report back to SCIC with a summary report on the outcome of the MCS workshop.

Report adoption and close of the meeting

134. The Chair thanked all delegates as well as the interpreters and stenographer for their efforts during the meeting. The report of SCIC was adopted and the 2021 meeting of SCIC was closed.
Korea, Republic of  

Greenstar  

**CM 10-01, paragraph 2 (ii), requires the marks shall be placed that they are not obscured by the fishing gear whether it is stowed or in use.**

New Zealand carried out an aerial surveillance patrol of the Ross Sea (Subarea 88.1) on the 15 January 2021. Photographs taken during the patrol and provided to Korea on 12 February 2021 identify the vessels deck markings of the Greenstar have been obscured by stowed fishing gear.

Korea responded on 2 April 2021 to the report on the aerial surveillance. Korea investigated the incident and concluded that it was an unintended and simple mistake coincidentally committed during the process of retrieving fishing gear and noted that the IRCS on the side of the vessel was still visible. Korea reported that the vessel’s company was given a stern warning to prevent a recurrence of making even the slightest part of identifiers obscured.

The operator and the vessel crew are fully aware of the requirement of vessel marking, and do not have any intention whatsoever to obscure markings. The marking on deck having been obscured by fishing gear is an honest mistake, which happened during the vessel’s busy and hurried operation to exit the area to comply with the closure notice. The markings on the vessel were all intact, and this was confirmed during the port inspection. The authority issued a warning to the company, and the operator took actions to prevent the same mistake from happening again. In addition to regular education and compliance instructions provided to the vessel master, officers and crew that the operator has always maintained, the company established a closed circuit monitoring camera on deck. With this, Korea finds this incident ‘Level 1 non-compliant with no further action required’. Attached here are the supporting documents:

1. Sea ice map on 14 January 2021  
2. VMS tracks  
3. Photo of the upper deck with the IRCS shown  
4. Instruction from the company to the vessel to stow fishing gear properly  
5. Educational material  
6. Upper deck closed circuit monitoring camera.  

Further Action:  
As the company has already taken actions to prevent future incidents, no further action is required.

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1).
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<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td><strong>CM 10-03, paragraph 8</strong>, requires the transmission of a port inspection report to the Secretariat within 30 days of the inspection date (or as soon as possible where compliance issues have arisen). The inspection of the French-flagged vessel <em>Ile Bourbon</em> occurred on 21 February 2020 at Le Port, Reunion Island (French Territory) and the transmission of the port inspection report occurred on 20 July 2020. The port inspection report noted fishing activity occurred in Area 51, specifically in the SIOFA Convention Area on the Del Cano Rise. This is also reported in the corresponding validated DCDs (FR-20-0006-E and FR-20-0007-E). Therefore, footnote 1 is not applicable to this port inspection. Time difference: 150 days.</td>
<td>France notes that the compliance assessment period for this year is from 1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021. If the inspection report was indeed transmitted during this period, the inspection in question was carried out on 21 February 2020, and therefore relates to the previous compliance assessment period. The non-compliance referred to here thus took place before discussions at CCAMLR-39, which have resulted in the implementation of corrective measures. Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1).</td>
<td>Minor non-compliant (Level 1)</td>
<td>See paragraphs 52 to 53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Korea, Republic of</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sae In Champion</strong></td>
<td><strong>CM 10-03, paragraph 4</strong>, requires vessels seeking entry to port to provide the information contained in Annex 10-03/A at least 48 hours in advance to allow adequate time to examine the required information. The inspection report for the <em>Sae In Champion</em> for the inspection undertaken by the United Kingdom on 8 June 2021 noted that they did not receive Part A (Annex 10-03/A) from the vessel at least 48 hours before entry to port. At the request of the carrier vessel, the <em>Sae In Champion</em> entered the waters of Berkely Sound to tranship. The master had thought that the transhipment would take place at Sea, so he submitted the notification to the Flag State and the CCAMLR Secretariat. He realised that was not the case later on, but the time was short to re-schedule the transhipment. Therefore, the vessel sent Annex 10-03/A on the day port entry, not being able to submit the document 48 hours in advance. This stemmed from misunderstanding, and the vessel or the operator did not have any intention to breach the provision on purpose. All the relevant operation was conducted in accordance with relevant regulations, under the authorisations of the Flag State and Port State. With this, Korean finds this incident 'Level 1 non-compliant with no further action required'.</td>
<td></td>
<td>See paragraphs 44 to 48</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
### Korea, Republic of

**CM 10-03, paragraph 4**, states that Contracting Parties shall require vessels seeking entry to their ports to provide the information contained in the template in Annex 10-03/A.

The port inspection report for the Russian-flagged *Pamyat Ilicha’s* entry to Busan, Korea did not provide an arrival time in Part A of the inspection report, nor did the inspectors provide any comments in Part A of the inspection report to confirm arrival time at port.

Korea was contacted on 23 July 2020 and provided confirmation for the inspection time but not the arrival time. The response provided was:

> ‘I confirm the time and date of inspection is 10:46 AM (UTC+9), 13 July 2020 as indicated in the port inspection report (Annex B). Annex A (port entry report) contains estimated date of arrival but does not indicate specific time as it was submitted prior to the vessel's port entry.’

The arrival time was 09:20 and it was checked by the inspector. However, the inspector did not enter the actual time by mistake. The data on the arrival time is maintained on the relevant system and can be verified. Korea will make sure that all the relevant information will be thoroughly entered in the format in the future. With this, Korean finds this incident ‘Level 1 non-compliant with no further action required’. Attached here are the revised documents:

1. Annex 10-03/A
2. Annex 10-03/B.

**Further Action:**

This was caused by an administrative mistake, and no further action is required.

**Preliminary Status:** Minor non-compliant (Level 1).

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<tr>
<td>Korea, Republic of</td>
<td>CM 10-03, paragraph 4</td>
<td>states that Contracting Parties shall require vessels seeking entry to their ports to provide the information contained in the template in Annex 10-03/A.</td>
<td>Attached here is the supporting document. It includes supporting information on the implementation of CM 10-03, and provides: 1. Annex 10-03/A sent to the agency with email correspondence 2. 72 hours prior transhipment notice 3. Completed transhipment notice 4. Transhipment authorisation from the Flag State authority 5. Transhipment authorisation from the Port State authority.  Further Action: This case was due to honest mistake about the mode of transhipment, and the relevant information was provided immediately afterwards. Therefore, no further action is required. Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1).</td>
<td>See paragraphs 44 to 48</td>
<td></td>
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Without the arrival time in port from either the vessel of the inspectors in Part A of the port inspection report the Secretariat was unable to assess compliance with CM 10-03, paragraph 5.

| Party         | Vessel                  | Implementation summary – Secretariat                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Response – Contracting Party                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Status                                                                 | SCIC response                                                                 |
|---------------|-------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Mauritius     | CM 10-03, paragraph 8   | requires the transmission of a port inspection report to the Secretariat within 30 days of the inspection date (or as soon as possible where compliance issues have arisen). The inspection of the Spanish-flagged vessel *Ibsa Quinto* occurred on 11 May 2020 and the transmission of the port inspection report occurred on 1 October 2020.                                                                                                           | The Port Inspection Report of F/V *Ibsa Quinto* was submitted after the query made by the European commission (DGMARE) on behalf of the Flag State (Spain) was attended to satisfaction by Mauritius as a Port State                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | Minor non-compliant (Level 1)                                                                                                               | See paragraphs 52 to 53                                                                 |
| New Zealand   | CM 10-03, paragraph 5   | requires that inspections shall be conducted within 48 hours of port entry. The Australian-flagged vessel *Antarctic Chieftain* entered the New Zealand port of Port Nelson on 9 December 2020 07:00 UTC and was inspected on 11 December 2020 21:15 UTC.                                                                                                                      | As per the explanation provided to the Secretariat, the delay in the inspection taking place was caused by the vessel having to leave port due to a biosecurity requirement (hull clean). The expected time to undertake the required hull clean was 2.5 days but the vessel returned to port earlier than expected. Due to the timing of the vessel’s return and other taskings of the inspectors, the CCAMLR inspection was not completed in the required 48 hour timeframe. New Zealand officials have improved administrative measures in place to ensure that other operational requirements do not prevent inspection within 48 hours of arrival at port as required. Further Action: No further action required. Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1). | Minor non-compliant (Level 1)                                                                                                               | See paragraph 49                                                                 |

Time difference: 143 days.

Time difference: 62 hours 15 minutes.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>Pamyat Ilicha</td>
<td>CM 10-03, paragraph 4, requires vessels seeking entry to port to provide the information contained in Annex 10-03/A at least 48 hours in advance to allow adequate time to examine the required information. The inspection report for the <em>Pamyat Ilicha</em> for the inspection undertaken by Korea on 13 July 2020 did not include an estimated time of arrival in Part A (Annex 10-03/A) as required.</td>
<td>In accordance with CM 10-03, paragraph 4, information on the intention to enter the port of Busan was presented to the port authorities on 7 July 2021. The expected arrival time at the port is 11 July 2021. At the same time, the waiting time varied due to quarantine restrictions. Further Action: No further action required. Preliminary Status: Compliant.</td>
<td>See paragraphs 44 to 48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td>CM 10-03, paragraph 5, requires that inspections shall be conducted within 48 hours of port entry. The Chinese-flagged vessel <em>Fu Rong Hai</em> entered the South African port of Cape Town on 29 September 2020 and was inspected on 8 October 2020. The Secretariat requested an explanation for the delay in accordance with CM 10-04, footnote 7 on 13 October 2020 and 19 October 2020. No explanation has been provided. Time delay: 9 days.</td>
<td>Human capacity remains a serious challenge in achieving our goal of port inspections within the required time. There has been a concerted effort in addressing the matter through advertising and filling vacant posts. The advent of the pandemic has added to the challenges in conduction inspections and monitoring of landings in the Cape Town port, which is a major hub for many sectors to offload. Further Action: Inadequate IT infrastructure also poses a challenge in performing duties efficiently. Procurement of replacement equipment has been initiated. Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1).</td>
<td>Minor non-compliant (Level 1)</td>
<td>See paragraphs 49 to 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td></td>
<td>CM 10-03, paragraph 5, requires that inspections shall be conducted within 48 hours of port entry. The Korean-flagged vessel <em>Meridian 8</em> entered the Uruguayan port of Montevideo on 30 April 2021 08:00 (LT) and was inspected on 3 May 2021 14:00 (LT). The following explanation was provided with the submission of the Port Inspection Report: The documentary inspection and authorization of entry of the BP to the port of Montevideo was carried out prior to its arrival. Although the ship requested to enter the port on Friday 30 April 2021, the physical inspection carried out by the Fisheries Authority could only be</td>
<td>The reasons for the delay were provided in the inspection report. Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1).</td>
<td>Minor non-compliant (Level 1)</td>
<td>See paragraph 49.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
### Conservation Measure 10-04

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Status</th>
<th>SCIC response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Antarctic Chieftain</td>
<td><strong>CM 10-04, paragraph 13</strong>, requires Flag States to notify the Secretariat within 24 hours of each entry to, exit from and movement between subareas of the Convention Area. Movement notification for the <em>Antarctic Chieftain</em> entering the Convention Area at Division 58.5.1 was provided to the Secretariat on 30 August 2020 23:16 UTC and confirmed as 29 August 2020 01:40 UTC. Time difference 1 day 21 hours 36 minutes.</td>
<td>The vessel notified Australia and France via email on 29 August 2020 at 1139 Canberra time (0239 UTC). The CCAMLR email address was inadvertently not included in the ‘To’ list of the email and the Secretariat was not notified at that time of the exit and entry of the vessel. Australia implements its CCAMLR obligations (including CM 10-04) via legislative instruments and licence conditions. Australia has put in place further measures to monitor that this vessel sends movement notifications to CCAMLR within 24 hours to ensure future compliance with the obligation. Further Action: No further action required. Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1).</td>
<td>Minor non-compliant (Level 1)</td>
<td>See paragraphs 54 to 55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| Australia | Cape Arkona | <strong>CM 10-04, paragraph 13</strong>, requires Flag States to notify the Secretariat within 24 hours of each entry to, exit from and movement between subareas of the Convention Area. According to VMS data held by the Secretariat, the <em>Cape Arkona</em> exited Division 58.5.2 and entered Division 58.5.1 on approximately 10 January 2021 00:24 (UTC). The Secretariat requested the movement notice from the Australian VMS Contact Officers on 11 January 2021. Movement notification was provided to the Secretariat on 11 January 2021 02:08 UTC and confirmed the movement time as 10 January 2021 00:30 UTC. | The vessel notified Australia and France via email on 10/01/2021 at 0913 Canberra time (23:13 UTC 09/01/2021). The CCAMLR email address was inadvertently not included in the ‘To’ list of the email and the Secretariat was not notified at that time of the entry and exit of the vessel. Australia implements its vessel level obligations (including CM 10-04) via legislative instruments and licence conditions. Australia has put in place further measures to monitor that this vessel sends movement notifications to CCAMLR within 24 hours to ensure future compliance with the obligation. Further Action: No further action required. Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1). | Minor non-compliant (Level 1) | See paragraphs 54 to 55 |</p>
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<th>SCIC response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| China | Fu Rong Hai | **CM 10-04, paragraph 13,** requires Flag States to notify the Secretariat within 24 hours of each entry to, exit from and movement between subareas of the Convention Area.  
Movement notification for the movement of the *Fu Rong Hai* between Subareas 48.4 and 48.3 was provided to the Secretariat on 24 January 2021 06:53 UTC and confirmed the movement as 22 January 2021 23:30 UTC.  
Time difference 25 hours 38 minutes.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | The *Fu Rong Hai* exited from Subarea 48.4 and entered Subarea 48.3 on Saturday, she reported in time. This movement report was submitted to the Secretariat on this Sunday. These occurred at the weekend.  
Preliminary Status: Compliant.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | See paragraphs 54 to 55 |               |
| China | Long Fa   | **CM 10-04, paragraph 13,** requires Flag States to notify the Secretariat within 24 hours of each entry to, exit from and movement between subareas of the Convention Area.  
Movement notification for the entry of the *Long Fa* into Subarea 48.3 was provided to the Secretariat on 13 June 2021 02:29 UTC and confirmed the movement as 11 June 2021 21:35 UTC.  
Time difference 28 hours 54 minutes.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | The *Long Fa* entered Subarea 48.3 on Saturday, she reported in time. This movement report was submitted to the Secretariat on this Sunday. These occurred at the weekend.  
Preliminary Status: Compliant.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | See paragraphs 54 to 55 |               |
| China | Long Teng | **CM 10-04, paragraph 13,** requires Flag States to notify the Secretariat within 24 hours of each entry to, exit from and movement between subareas of the Convention Area.  
The Secretariat received the submission of a CE form for the Long Teng without having been notified of its movement from Subarea 48.2 to Subarea 48.1. The Secretariat does not receive VMS data for this vessel whilst it operates in the Convention Area.  
The Secretariat requested the movement notice from the Chinese VMS Contact Officers on 29 March 2021.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | The *Long Teng* reported in time. The delay was caused by administrative and technical problems at the contacts.  
Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | Minor non-compliant (Level 1) | See paragraphs 54 to 55 |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Vessel</th>
<th>Implementation summary – Secretariat</th>
<th>Response – Contracting Party</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>SCIC response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td><em>Albius</em></td>
<td>Movement notification was provided to the Secretariat on 29 March 2021 04:55 UTC and confirmed the movement as 21 March 2021 15:00 UTC. Time difference 7 days 11 hours 55 minutes.</td>
<td>The vessel did notify its entry to the French FMC on 21 January at 5:20 pm. The transmission error comes from the absence of a subject title in the notification email, which did not allow its further transmission by the FMC to the Secretariat. Further Action: Corrective measures and procedures to be implemented internally. Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1).</td>
<td>Minor non-compliant (Level 1)</td>
<td>See paragraphs 54 to 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td><em>Ile Bourbon</em></td>
<td><strong>CM 10-04, paragraph 13</strong>, requires Flag States to notify the Secretariat within 24 hours of each entry to, exit from and movement between subareas of the Convention Area. According to VMS data held by the Secretariat, the <em>Ile Bourbon</em> exited the Convention Area at Division 58.5.1 on approximately 30 March 2021 07:05 UTC. Two issues of non-compliance have been identified. According to VMS data held by the Secretariat, the <em>Ile Bourbon</em> exited the Convention Area at Division 58.5.1 on approximately 30 March 2021 07:05 UTC. The Secretariat requested the movement notice from the French VMS Contact Officers on 13 April 2021. Movement notification was provided to the Secretariat on 30 March 2021 and 27 May 2021, errors on the part of the French FMC led to the entry-exit notifications not being sent. These errors were immediately corrected by sending the notifications to the CCAMLR Secretariat on the day the FMC received the request, namely 13 April and 1 June 2021. Further Action: Corrective measures and procedures to be implemented internally. Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1).</td>
<td></td>
<td>Minor non-compliant (Level 1)</td>
<td>See paragraphs 54 to 55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Movement notification was provided to the Secretariat on 13 April 2021 08:14 UTC and confirmed the movement as 30 March 2021 06:28 UTC.

Time difference 14 days 1 hour 46 minutes.

According to VMS data held by the Secretariat, the *Ile Bourbon* entered Division 58.5.1 on approximately 27 May 2021 20:02 UTC.

Movement notification was provided by France on 1 June 2021 06:02 UTC and confirmed the movement time as 27 May 2021 19:40 UTC.

Time difference 4 days 10 hours 22 minutes.

France  
*Ile de la Reunion*  

CM 10-04, paragraph 13, requires Flag States to notify the Secretariat within 24 hours of each entry to, exit from and movement between subareas of the Convention Area.

Two issues of non-compliance have been identified.

According to VMS data held by the Secretariat, the *Ile de la Reunion II* entered the Convention Area at Division 58.5.1 on approximately 3 April 2021 00:25 UTC.

The Secretariat requested the movement notice from the French VMS Contact Officers on 13 April 2021.

Movement notification was provided to the Secretariat on 13 April 2021 08:14 UTC and confirmed the movement as 03 April 2021 00:10 UTC.

Time difference 10 days 8 hours 16 minutes.

According to VMS data held by the Secretariat, the *Ile de la Reunion II* moved between Division 58.5.1 and Subarea 58.6 on approximately 16 May 2021 17:25 UTC.

On 3 May, a notification was sent by the vessel to the FMC but a firewall prevented the reception of the message by the FMC, which induced the delay in transmitting the notification to the Secretariat.

The errors were corrected by the FMC as soon as it was requested by the CCAMLR Secretariat.

Further Action:
Corrective measures and procedures to be implemented internally.

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1).

Minor non-compliant (Level 1)  
See paragraphs 54 to 55
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Vessel</th>
<th>Implementation summary – Secretariat</th>
<th>Response – Contracting Party</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>SCIC response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Mascareignes III</td>
<td>The Secretariat requested the movement notice from the French VMS Contact Officers on 19 May 2021. Movement notification was provided to the Secretariat on 19 May 2021 06:25 UTC and confirmed the movement as 16 May 2021 16:40 UTC. Time difference 2 days 13 hours 45 minutes.</td>
<td>On 20 April 2021, an error on the part of the French FMC led to the notification not being sent. This error was corrected on 27 April 2021, following a request from the CCAMLR Secretariat. Further Action: Corrective measures and procedures to be implemented internally. Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1).</td>
<td>Minor non-compliant (Level 1)</td>
<td>See paragraphs 54 to 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, Republic of</td>
<td>Sae In Champion</td>
<td>CM 10-04, paragraph 13, requires Flag States to notify the Secretariat within 24 hours of each entry to, exit from and movement between subareas of the Convention Area. According to VMS data held by the Secretariat, the Sae In Champion entered the Convention Area at Subarea 48.1 on approximately 3 April 2021 12:29 UTC. The Secretariat requested the movement notice from the Korean VMS contact officers on 13 April 2021. The vessel sent via email its prior entry report ahead of its entry into Subarea 48.1 on 3 April, but mistakenly made a typo in the recipient’s email address (<a href="mailto:vms@ccamlr.org">vms@ccamlr.org</a>). On 13 April, the Secretariat contacted the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries of Korea to advise the non-reception of the entry report, and that was when the mistake was identified. The vessel resent the report to the right address, forwarding its previous email that had been sent to the wrong address. The operator will make sure that the same mistake will not happen in the future, and instructed the vessel to take due care. With this explanation, Korea finds this incident is</td>
<td>Compliant</td>
<td>See paragraphs 54 to 55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Vessel</td>
<td>Implementation summary – Secretariat</td>
<td>Response – Contracting Party</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>SCIC response</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>San Aspiring</td>
<td>Movement notification was provided to the Secretariat on 13 April 2021 04:49 UTC and confirmed the movement as 3 April 2021 12:25 UTC. An explanation was provided for the lateness of the transmission highlighting that an error occurred in writing the Secretariat’s email address. Time difference 9 days 16 hours 24 minutes.</td>
<td>technically ‘Compliant’. Attached here is the supporting document. It includes supporting evidence that covers the compliance issue on CM 10-04, and provides: 1. Original email messages sending the prior entry report to the wrong email address 2. Original email messages sending the entry report to the wrong email address 3. Email correspondence involving the CCAMLR Secretariat and the Korean Fisheries Monitoring Center 4. Email message resending the report to the correct address. Further Action: No further action is required Preliminary Status: Compliant.</td>
<td>Minor non-compliant (Level 1)</td>
<td>See paragraphs 54 to 55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| South Africa | El Shaddai  | CM 10-04, paragraph 13, requires Flag States to notify the Secretariat within 24 hours of each entry to, exit from and movement between subareas of the Convention Area. Movement notification for the San Aspiring entering the Convention Area at Subarea 48.3 was provided by New Zealand on 4 July 2020 22:34 UTC and confirmed the movement time as 6 July 2020 00:45 UTC. Time difference 26 hours 11 minutes. | The response will be submitted as an additional document. Preliminary Status: Compliant. | Minor non-compliant (Level 1) | See paragraphs 54 to 55 |
Four issues of non-compliance have been identified.

Movement notification for the *El Shaddai* entering Subarea 58.7 was provided to the Secretariat on 31 January 2021 18:59 UTC and confirmed the movement as 30 January 2021 16:46 UTC.

Time difference 26 hours 13 minutes.

Movement notification for the *El Shaddai* entering Subarea 58.7 was provided by South Africa on 15 February 2021 07:01 UTC and confirmed the movement time as 13 February 2021 21:28 UTC.

Time difference 33 hours 33 minutes.

According to VMS data held by the Secretariat, the *El Shaddai* entered the Convention Area at Subarea 58.7 on approximately 15 February 2021 14:28 UTC.

The Secretariat requested the movement notice from the South African VMS Contact Officers on 23 March 2021.

Movement notification was provided to the Secretariat on 25 March 2021 08:36 UTC and confirmed the movement as 15 February 2021 11:46 UTC.

Time difference 37 days 20 hours 50 minutes.

According to VMS data held by the Secretariat, the *El Shaddai* entered the Convention Area at Subarea 58.7 on approximately 31 May 2021 23:14 UTC.

The Secretariat requested the movement notice from the South African VMS Contact Officers on 7 June 2021.

Movement notification was provided by South Africa on 7 June 2021 08:14 UTC and confirmed the movement time as 31 May 2021 23:14 UTC.

Time difference 6 days 9 hours.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Vessel</th>
<th>Implementation summary – Secretariat</th>
<th>Response – Contracting Party</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>SCIC response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Koryo Maru No. 11</td>
<td><strong>CM 10-04, paragraph 13,</strong> requires Flag States to notify the Secretariat within 24 hours of each entry to, exit from and movement between subareas of the Convention Area.</td>
<td>Document with response uploaded.</td>
<td>Minor non-compliant (Level 1)</td>
<td>See paragraphs 54 to 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Seven issues of non-compliance have been identified.</td>
<td>Preliminary Status: Compliant.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>According to VMS data held by the Secretariat, the <strong>Koryo Maru No. 11</strong> entered the Convention Area at Subarea 58.7 on approximately 10 October 2020 10:40 UTC.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Secretariat requested the movement notice from the South African VMS Contact Officers on 16 October 2020.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Movement notification was provided to the Secretariat on 16 October 2020 06:01 UTC and confirmed the movement time as 10 October 2020 09:54 UTC</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Time difference 5 days 20 hours 7 minutes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Movement notification for the <strong>Koryo Maru No. 11</strong> entering the Convention Area at Subarea 58.7 was provided to the Secretariat on 7 November 2020 10:14 UTC and confirmed the movement as 5 November 2020 14:52 UTC.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Time difference 43 hours 22 minutes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>According to VMS data held by the Secretariat, the <strong>Koryo Maru No. 11</strong> exited the Convention Area at Subarea 58.7 on approximately 28 November 2020 16:02 UTC.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Secretariat requested the movement notice from the South African VMS Contact Officers on 30 November 2020.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Movement notification was provided by South Africa on 30 November 2020 07:06 UTC and confirmed the movement time as 28 November 2020 15:16 UTC.

Time difference 39 hours 50 minutes.

Movement notification for the *Koryo Maru No. 11* entering the Convention Area at Subarea 58.7 was provided to the Secretariat on 21 February 2021 16:46 UTC and confirmed the movement as 20 February 2021 14:18 UTC.

Time difference 26 hours 28 minutes.

According to VMS data held by the Secretariat, the *Koryo Maru No. 11* entered the Convention Area at Subarea 58.7 on approximately 17 March 2021 14:46 UTC.

The Secretariat requested the movement notice from the South African VMS Contact Officers on 19 March 2021.

Movement notification was provided to the Secretariat on 19 March 2021 08:16 UTC and confirmed the movement as 17 March 2021 15:02 UTC.

Time difference 41 hours 14 minutes.

According to VMS data held by the Secretariat, the *Koryo Maru No. 11* exited the Convention Area at Subarea 58.7 on approximately 17 March 2021 00:40 UTC.

The Secretariat requested the movement notice from the South African VMS Contact Officers on 19 March 2021.

Movement notification was provided to the Secretariat on 19 March 2021 08:16 UTC and
Ukraine  

**Simeiz**

**CM 10-04, paragraph 13**, requires Flag States to notify the Secretariat within 24 hours of each entry to, exit from and movement between subareas of the Convention Area.

According to VMS data held by the Secretariat, the *Simeiz* moved between Subareas 88.3 and 88.2 on approximately 17 November 2020 06:38 UTC.  

The Secretariat requested the movement notice from the Ukrainian VMS Contact Officer on 18 November 2020, 19 November 2020, 23 November 2020 and 25 November 2020. No movement notification has been provided.

Notification according to CM 10-04, paragraph 13 was sent from the *Simeiz* on 17 November 2020 at 05:44 UTC prior the entering Subarea 88.2 to the list of emails, including data@ccamlr.org.

This notification consisted of all fields listed in Annex 10-04-A.  

Preliminary Status: Compliant.

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**Conservation Measure 10-05**

Argentina

**CM 10-05, paragraph 6**, requires that each Contracting Party and non-Contracting Party cooperating with CCAMLR by participating in the CDS shall require that each shipment of *Dissostichus* spp. imported into, or exported or re-exported from its territory be accompanied by a DED or DRED. The import, export or re-export of *Dissostichus* spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited. The import, export or re-export of *Dissostichus* spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited.

Nil response

Compliant

See paragraph 60

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Analysis of the e-CDS data has identified Argentina validated 1 DED/DRED after the declared export date. The identified DEDs/DREDs account for <1 % of Argentina's exports. The time difference between the export and validation for the identified document are:
- 1 DED/DRED was issued between 300 and 400 days after declared export date.
A list of individual DED/DRED document numbers are available as an attachment to this record on the website.

Australia

CM 10-05, paragraph 6, requires that each Contracting Party and non-Contracting Party cooperating with CCAMLR by participating in the CDS shall require that each shipment of Dissostichus spp. imported into, or exported or re-exported from its territory be accompanied by a DED or DRED. The import, export or re-export of Dissostichus spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited. The import, export or re-export of Dissostichus spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited.

Analysis of the e-CDS data has identified Australia validated 1 DED/DRED after the declared export date. The identified DED/DRED account for 1% of Australia's exports. The time difference between the export and validation for the identified document are:
- 1 DED/DRED was issued between 1 and 2 days after declared export date.

A list of individual DED/DRED document numbers are available as an attachment to this record on the website.

This re-export involved Dissostichus spp that were caught by an Australian vessel. The catch was landed in Mauritius (and the DCD was verified) and then exported to Australia, accompanied by a DED. The shipment of Dissostichus was scheduled to be re-exported from Australia on 19 February 2021 however, the shipment date was 14 February 2021 (which was a Sunday). A request for a DRED was received on 15 February 2021 and the DRED was issued for the re-export on Tuesday 16 February 2021. Australian authorities investigated the incident and determined that there was a miscommunication in relation to the shipment date. Australian authorities have reminded the fishing company of its obligations and the fishing company has amended its procedures to ensure that any future DED/DRED is applied for and approved prior to the container moving to the wharf, so that any changes in shipping dates do not result in non-compliance.

Further Action:
No further action required.

Preliminary Status: Non-compliant (Level 2).

Minor non-compliant (Level 1) See paragraph 61
### Belgium

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementation summary – Secretariat</th>
<th>Response – Contracting Party</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>SCIC response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CM 10-05, paragraph 6</strong>, requires that each Contracting Party and non-Contracting Party cooperating with CCAMLR by participating in the CDS shall require that each shipment of <em>Dissostichus</em> spp. imported into, or exported or re-exported from its territory be accompanied by a DED or DRED. The import, export or re-export of <em>Dissostichus</em> spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited. The import, export or re-export of <em>Dissostichus</em> spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited. Analysis of the e-CDS data has identified Belgium validated 1 DED/DRED after the declared export date. The identified DRED account for 100% of Belgium's exports. The time difference between the export and validation for the identified document are: • 1 DED/DRED was issued between 21 and 50 days after declared export date. The Secretariat notes that it provided assistance to Belgium in completing this DRED and that the circumstances which led to this scenario were a result of the exit by the United Kingdom from the European Union. A list of individual DED/DRED document numbers are available as an attachment to this record on the website.</td>
<td>Nil response</td>
<td>See paragraphs 62 to 63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Chile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementation summary – Secretariat</th>
<th>Response – Contracting Party</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>SCIC response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CM 10-05, paragraph 6</strong>, requires that each Contracting Party and non-Contracting Party cooperating with CCAMLR by participating in the CDS shall require that each shipment of <em>Dissostichus</em> spp. imported into, or exported or re-exported from its territory be accompanied by a DED or DRED. The import, export or re-export of <em>Dissostichus</em> spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited. The import, export or re-export of <em>Dissostichus</em> spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited. The gap between the export dates and the validation dates in the DEDs reported was due to delays between the delivery, by the requesting agent, of the Bill of Landing (BL) that had to be validated by the Customs Authority and their control by the officers in charge of the e-CDS at the time of the DEDs validation. This document (BL) certifies the number of the container where the exported products are</td>
<td></td>
<td>See paragraph 64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Chile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vessel</th>
<th>Implementation summary – Secretariat</th>
<th>Response – Contracting Party</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>SCIC response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Dissostichus spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited. Analysis of the e-CDS data has identified Chile validated 377 DED/DREDs after the declared export date. The identified DEDs/DREDs account for 23% of Chile's exports. The time difference between the export and validation for the identified documents are:  
- 27 DEDs/DREDs were issued between 1 and 2 days after declared export date.  
- 52 DEDs/DREDs were issued between 3 and 5 days after declared export date.  
- 149 DEDs/DREDs were issued between 6 and 10 days after declared export date.  
- 106 DEDs/DREDs were issued between 11 and 20 days after declared export date.  
- 43 DEDs/DREDs were issued between 21 and 50 days after declared export date.  
A list of individual DED/DRED document numbers are available as an attachment to this record on the website. | shipped, which is part of the background information required for inclusion in the DED. Chile, through the authority in charge of managing the e-CDS, has investigated the relevant cases and identified the national administrative bodies where most of those gaps were detected. In an effort to avoid and correct these non-compliance events relating to the failure to fulfil their obligations in a timely manner, measures have been taken to improve the administrative procedures. As such, the protocols followed by the units in charge of the relevant tasks shall be reinforced and subject to further monitoring. | Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1). |  |

### China

**CM 10-05, paragraph 6**, requires that each Contracting Party and non-Contracting Party cooperating with CCAMLR by participating in the CDS shall require that each shipment of Dissostichus spp. imported into, or exported or re-exported from its territory be accompanied by a DED or DRED. The import, export or re-export of Dissostichus spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited. The import, export or re-export of Dissostichus spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited. Analysis of the e-CDS data has identified China validated 2 DED/DREDs after the declared export date. In these two DREDs, the 'Date of Issue' in Part 2 was the issue time of the bill of lading, not the real 'Export date'. The 'Date' in Part 5 was the issue time of the DREDs. |  | Preliminary Status: Compliant. | See paragraph 65 |
The identified DEDs/DREDs account for 50% of China's exports.

The time difference between the export and validation for the identified documents are:

- 1 DED/DRED was issued between 3 and 5 days after declared export date.
- 1 DED/DRED was issued between 6 and 10 days after declared export date.

A list of individual DED/DRED document numbers are available as an attachment to this record on the website.

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France

**CM 10-05, paragraph 6,** requires that each Contracting Party and non-Contracting Party cooperating with CCAMLR by participating in the CDS shall require that each shipment of *Dissostichus* spp. imported into, or exported or re-exported from its territory be accompanied by a DED or DRED. The import, export or re-export of *Dissostichus* spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited. The import, export or re-export of *Dissostichus* spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited.

Analysis of the e-CDS data has identified France validated 118 DED/DREDs after the declared export date.

The identified DEDs/DREDs account for 37% of France's exports.

The time difference between the export and validation for the identified documents are:

- 25 DEDs/DREDs were issued between 1 and 2 days after declared export date.
- 80 DEDs/DREDs were issued between 3 and 5 days after declared export date.
- 8 DEDs/DREDs were issued between 6 and 10 days after declared export date.
- 3 DEDs/DREDs were issued between 11 and 20 days after declared export date.

Paragraph A7 of CM 10-05, Annex 10-05A, requires DEDs to include the 'date of issue' (paragraph A7(ix)(1)(d)).

There seems to be a difficulty on how this measure is interpreted. Indeed, shipping companies indicate in this section the date when toothfish packages are stuffed in the containers. The validation date of the DED by the French administration is therefore subsequent to the stuffing date, as the traceability system as it exists within our administration aims to confirm that the goods circulating in a given container are legal and clearly identified.

In any case, the DEDs are issued before the toothfish leaves French territory, in compliance with CM 10-05.

France therefore has a different interpretation of the 'date of issue' field, since the CCAMLR Secretariat seems to interpret this date as the date of departure of the container from the port of export.

France requests that the CCAMLR Secretariat provide clarifications on this matter, so that instructions for filling out DEDs can be shared with the industry and the administration.
### Mauritius

**CM 10-05, paragraph 6.** requires that each Contracting Party and non-Contracting Party cooperating with CCAMLR by participating in the CDS shall require that each shipment of *Dissostichus* spp. imported into, or exported or re-exported from its territory be accompanied by a DED or DRED. The import, export or re-export of *Dissostichus* spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited. The import, export or re-export of *Dissostichus* spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited.

Analysis of the e-CDS data has identified Mauritius validated 4 DEDs/DREDs after the declared export date.

The identified DEDs/DREDs account for 3% of Mauritius’ exports.

The time difference between the export and validation for the identified documents are:

- **4 DEDs/DREDs were issued between 1 and 2 days after declared export date.**

A list of individual DED/DRED document numbers are available as an attachment to this record on the website.

### Netherlands

**CM 10-05, paragraph 6.** requires that each Contracting Party and non-Contracting Party cooperating with CCAMLR by participating in the CDS shall require that each shipment of *Dissostichus* spp. imported into, or exported or re-exported from its territory be accompanied by a DED or DRED. The import, export or re-export of *Dissostichus* spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited. The import, export or re-export of *Dissostichus* spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited.

**Nil response**

Additional information required See paragraph 68 to 69
### Dissostichus spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited.

Analysis of the e-CDS data has identified the Netherlands validated 4 DEDs/DREDs after the declared export date.

The identified DEDs/DREDs account for 22% of the Netherlands' exports.

The time difference between the export and validation for the identified documents are:

- 1 DED/DRED was issued between 3 and 5 days after declared export date.
- 3 DEDs/DREDs were issued between 6 and 10 days after declared export date.

A list of individual DED/DRED document numbers are available as an attachment to this record on the website.

### New Zealand CM 10-05, paragraph 6, requires that each Contracting Party and non-Contracting Party cooperating with CCAMLR by participating in the CDS shall require that each shipment of Dissostichus spp. imported into, or exported or re-exported from its territory be accompanied by a DED or DRED. The import, export or re-export of Dissostichus spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited. The issues raised in relation to CM 10-05, paragraph 6, relate to two separate shipments exported from New Zealand, addressed in turn below.

First two DRED issues:

The New Zealand CDS officer was contacted by the Secretariat on 10 September 2020 advising that two DREDs that were part of one shipment sent to the importing state had not been completed correctly. On checking the documents, it was found that an administrative error had occurred, and the Contracting Party had not validated the DREDs before sending them to the exporter.

After discussing the issue with the CCAMLR Secretariat, the New Zealand CDS Officer validated the documents retrospectively and submitted the corrected DREDs to the receiving state. The audit logs show that both documents were generated and details completed prior to the shipment leaving New Zealand.

### SCIC-2021 Report – Preliminary version

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Party</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>CM 10-05, paragraph 6</td>
<td>requires that each Contracting Party and non-Contracting Party cooperating with CCAMLR by participating in the CDS shall require that each shipment of Dissostichus spp. imported into, or exported or re-exported from its territory be accompanied by a DED or DRED. The import, export or re-export of Dissostichus spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited. The issues raised in relation to CM 10-05, paragraph 6, relate to two separate shipments exported from New Zealand, addressed in turn below.</td>
<td>The issues raised in relation to CM 10-05, paragraph 6, relate to two separate shipments exported from New Zealand, addressed in turn below. First two DRED issues: The New Zealand CDS officer was contacted by the Secretariat on 10 September 2020 advising that two DREDs that were part of one shipment sent to the importing state had not been completed correctly. On checking the documents, it was found that an administrative error had occurred, and the Contracting Party had not validated the DREDs before sending them to the exporter. After discussing the issue with the CCAMLR Secretariat, the New Zealand CDS Officer validated the documents retrospectively and submitted the corrected DREDs to the receiving state. The audit logs show that both documents were generated and details completed prior to the shipment leaving New Zealand.</td>
<td>Minor non-compliant (Level 1)</td>
<td>See paragraph 70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• 3 DEDs/DREDs were issued between 21 and 50 days after declared export date.
A list of individual DED/DRED document numbers are available as an attachment to this record on the website.

Third DED issue:
New Zealand officials were contacted by the exporter and informed that an additional amount of product had not been scanned when it was loaded into the container. This was confirmed by video footage taken at the time of loading.
New Zealand officials contacted the CDS contact from the importing state and advised them of the issue. After discussion, the contracting states agreed to complete the additional paperwork to allow the shipment to proceed. To allow full transparency a separate DED for the additional amount of toothfish product was generated.
The exporter advised that in response to the error additional protocols have been put in place to mitigate against a repeat of the issue.
Further Action:
No further action required.
Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1).

South Africa

CM 10-05, paragraph 6, requires that each Contracting Party and non-Contracting Party cooperating with CCAMLR by participating in the CDS shall require that each shipment of Dissostichus spp. imported into, or exported or re-exported from its territory be accompanied by a DED or DRED. The import, export or re-export of Dissostichus spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited. The import, export or re-export of Dissostichus spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited.
Analysis of the e-CDS data has identified South Africa validated 1 DED/DRED after the declared export date.
The identified DEDs/DREDs account for 3% of South Africa's exports.

Our client requested a DED on Friday 9 April 2021 from the Department. The DED was subsequently processed by the Department on Monday 12 April 2021. The Department captured the DED which erroneously showed the export date as 9 April 2021, whereas the export date as per received Bill of Lading provided by the client (which is available on request) reflects the fish loaded and thus export date as 15 April 2021. The DED was subsequently corrected and reflects the correct export date of 15 April 2021.
Further Action:
No further action required.
Preliminary Status: Compliant.

Compliant See paragraph 70
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>CM 10-05, paragraph 6, requires that each Contracting Party and non-Contracting Party cooperating with CCAMLR by participating in the CDS shall require that each shipment of <em>Dissostichus</em> spp. imported into, or exported or re-exported from its territory be accompanied by a DED or DRED. The import, export or re-export of <em>Dissostichus</em> spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited. The import, export or re-export of <em>Dissostichus</em> spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited. Analysis of the e-CDS data has identified Spain validated 25 DEDs/DREDs after the declared export date. The identified DEDs/DREDs account for 17% of Spain's exports. The time difference between the export and validation for the identified documents are: • 1 DED/DRED was issued between 3 and 5 days after declared export date. • 11 DEDs/DREDs were issued between 3 and 5 days after declared export date. • 14 DEDs/DREDs were issued between 6 and 10 days after declared export date. A list of individual DED/DRED document numbers are available as an attachment to this record on the website.</td>
<td>Nil response</td>
<td>See paragraph 71</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>CM 10-05, paragraph 6, requires that each Contracting Party and non-Contracting Party cooperating with CCAMLR by participating in the CDS shall require that each shipment</td>
<td>The UK investigated this potential infringement. The issues identified relate to one landing by the FV <em>Argos Froyanes</em> on the 9 September 2020. The relevant DCDs (GB-20-0020-E and GB-20-0017-E)</td>
<td>Minor non-compliant (Level 1)</td>
<td>See paragraph 70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### United States of America

**CM 10-05, paragraph 6**, requires that each Contracting Party and non-Contracting Party cooperating with CCAMLR by participating in the CDS shall require that each shipment of *Dissostichus* spp. imported into, or exported or re-exported from its territory be accompanied by a DED or DRED. The import, export or re-export of *Dissostichus* spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited. The import, export or re-export of *Dissostichus* spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited.

Analysis of the e-CDS data has identified the USA validated 1 DED/DRED after the declared export date.

The identified DRED account for 1% of the USA’s exports.

A U.S.-permitted dealer submitted an application for re-export of 30 kgs of frozen toothfish previously imported from France under FR-19-0022-E. This re-export application was submitted on Thursday 17 December. However, due to technical problems with the submission, the DRED was not issued until Monday 21 December with the date of export listed as 17 December, resulting in the 4-day discrepancy. A query of internal trade monitoring databases was used to verify that the export date was 17 December.

**Further Action:**

This matter has been referred to the NOAA Fisheries Office of Law Enforcement for possible further action. In addition, the USA is considering amendments to its regulations implementing CM 10-05 to emphasise the requirement that the DRED must accompany the shipment and therefore shipment should only occur after the issuance of the DRED.

**Status**: Minor non-compliant (Level 1)

**SCIC response**: See paragraph 70.
### Party Vessel Implementation summary – Secretariat Response – Contracting Party Status SCIC response

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<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>CM 10-05, paragraph 3</td>
<td>requires Each Contracting Party and non-Contracting Party cooperating with CCAMLR by participating in the CDS shall require that each landing of <em>Dissostichus</em> spp. at its ports be accompanied by a completed DCD. A request under CM 10-05, paragraph 12, was received by the Secretariat for additional verification for a DCD for the Ukrainian-flagged <em>Polus 1</em> which landed catch in Montevideo, Uruguay on 2 March 2020. The review of the DCD has identified that the catch quantity as of 22 July 2021 has not been verified and entered into the e-CDS, thus a DCD has not been completed as required by CM 10-05, paragraph 3.</td>
<td>A DCD was issued, but was not completely entered in the e-CDS, and the DEDs and DREDs were issued late. Further Action: Investigations are being conducted to determine the reasons behind this non-compliance event.</td>
<td>Minor non-compliant (Level 1)</td>
<td>See paragraph 57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>CM 10-05, paragraph 6</td>
<td>requires that each Contracting Party and non-Contracting Party cooperating with CCAMLR by participating in the CDS shall require that each shipment of <em>Dissostichus</em> spp. imported into, or exported or re-exported from its territory be accompanied by a DED or DRED. The import, export or re-export of <em>Dissostichus</em> spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited. The import, export or re-export of <em>Dissostichus</em> spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited. Analysis of the e-CDS data has identified Uruguay validated 82 DEDs/DREDs after the declared export date.</td>
<td>The DEDs and DREDs were issued late. Further Action: Pertaining investigations are under way to determine the proceedings that led to this non-compliance event.</td>
<td>Minor non-compliant (Level 1)</td>
<td>See paragraph 70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The time difference between the export and validation for the identified document are:
- 1 DED/DRED was issued between 3 and 5 days after declared export date.

A list of individual DED/DRED document numbers is available as an attachment to this record on the website.

DRED. CDS Officers have taken responsibility on this matter and are increasing their vigilance in toothfish re-export processing to prevent this situation from occurring again.

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1).
The identified DEDs/DREDs account for 63% of Uruguay's exports.

The time difference between the export and validation for the identified documents are:

- 4 DEDs/DREDs were issued between 3 and 5 days after declared export date.
- 24 DEDs/DREDs were issued between 6 and 10 days after declared export date.
- 12 DEDs/DREDs were issued between 11 and 20 days after declared export date.
- 32 DEDs/DREDs were issued between 21 and 50 days after declared export date.
- 5 DEDs/DREDs were issued between 51 and 100 days after declared export date.
- 4 DEDs/DREDs were issued between 201 and 300 days after declared export date.
- 1 DED/DRED was issued between 300 and 400 days after declared export date.

A list of individual DED/DRED document numbers are available as an attachment to this record on the website.

### Conservation Measure 10-09

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<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td><strong>CM 10-09, paragraph 2</strong>, requires that each Contracting Party as a Flag State shall notify the Secretariat at least 72 hours in advance if any of its vessels intend to tranship within the Convention Area. Analysis of the transhipment data identified non-compliance with 3 notifications. The identified transhipments account for 33% of Chile’s transhipments. The time differences between the date and time of when the notification was sent (according to the metadata in the notification) and the notified time are:</td>
<td>The non-compliance event regarding the deadlines for the notification of the transhipments in question was caused by issues in the internal administrative coordination between the public officers in charge of notifying transhipment activities. With the aim of avoiding new instances of non-compliance regarding notification deadlines, administrative measures will be put in place, including acting according to the CM with regards to the delegation/authorisation for vessels to send those notifications directly to the Secretariat, which shall in turn be duly monitored by the competent national authority. Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1).</td>
<td>Minor non-compliant (Level 1)</td>
<td>See paragraph 74.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>CM 10-09, paragraph 5, requires each Contracting Party to provide confirmation of transhipment to the Secretariat within three (3) working days of any of its vessels having transhipped within the Convention Area. Analysis of the transhipment data identified non-compliance with two confirmations. The identified transhipments account for 22% of Chile’s transhipments. The time differences between the date and time of when the confirmations were sent (according to the metadata in the notification) and the confirmed transhipment completion are:</td>
<td>As in the previous cases, Chile states that the non-compliance instances regarding the timely confirmation of the referred transhipments stemmed from internal coordination issues between the officers in charge of those communications. With the aim of avoiding new instances of non-compliance regarding notification deadlines, the necessary administrative measures will be put in place, including acting according to the conservation measure with regards to the delegation/authorisation for vessels to send those confirmations directly to the Secretariat, which shall in turn be duly monitored by the competent national authority. Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1).</td>
<td>Minor non-compliant (Level 1)</td>
<td>See paragraph 86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>CM 10-09, paragraph 2, requires that each Contracting Party as a Flag State shall notify the Secretariat at least 72 hours in advance if any of its vessels intend to tranship within the Convention Area. Analysis of the transhipment data identified non-compliance with five notifications. The identified transhipments account for 5% of China’s transhipments. THP_ID110338, THP_ID113952: The Long Teng reported the transhipment notification in time. The delay was caused by administrative and technical problems at the contacts. THP_ID114354: This was caused by multiple submission of updated information after the original submission of transhipment notification. The submitted notification on 14 June ‘Long Fa will refuel from Hai Feng 688</td>
<td>THP_ID110338, THP_ID113952: The Long Teng reported the transhipment notification in time. The delay was caused by administrative and technical problems at the contacts. THP_ID114354: This was caused by multiple submission of updated information after the original submission of transhipment notification. The submitted notification on 14 June ‘Long Fa will refuel from Hai Feng 688</td>
<td>See paragraph 77</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Three of these notifications acknowledge the lateness of the notifications in their submissions to the Secretariat.

The time differences between the date and time of when the notification was sent (according to the metadata in the notification) and the notified time are:

- 2 notifications were sent 59–50 hours before notified transhipment time.
- 1 notification was sent 9–0 hours before notified transhipment time.
- 1 notification was sent 25–48 hours after notified transhipment time.
- 1 notification was sent 49–72 hours after notified transhipment time.

A list of individual transhipments are available as an attachment to this record on the website.

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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
<td>Three of these notifications acknowledge the lateness of the notifications in their submissions to the Secretariat.</td>
<td>THP_ID 113750, 113752: The Long Fa reported the transhipment notification in time. The delay was caused by administrative and technical problems at the contacts. Preliminary Status: Compliant.</td>
<td>No compliance status assigned</td>
<td>See paragraph 80</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>on 16 June’ is not a new one, it is the second change of the original one submitted on 10 June 2021.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CM 10-09, paragraph 3.</td>
<td>requires that each Contracting Party as a Flag State shall notify the Secretariat at least 2 hours in advance if any of its vessels intend to tranship items other than harvested marine living resources, bait or fuel within the Convention Area. Analysis of the transhipment data identified non-compliance with three notifications. The identified transhipment account for 3% of China’s transhipments. The time differences between the date and time of when the notification was sent (according to the metadata in the notification) and the notified time are:</td>
<td>THP_ID 110375: All communications about this transhipment were occurred during off-hours. So was the submission of transhipment notification. THP_ID 114424: This is a case of emergency relating to the safety of crew members on board. The Long Fa had to transfer a crew member to cargo vessel for the sake of his health condition. THP_ID 110007: This is an emergent case. The Long Teng had to replenish spare parts from the Long Fa for the sake of her safety. Preliminary Status: Compliant.</td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>CM 10-09, paragraph 5</td>
<td>requires each Contracting Party to provide confirmation of transhipment to the Secretariat within three (3) working days of any of its vessels having transhipped within the Convention Area. Analysis of the transhipment data identified non-compliance with one confirmation. Acknowledgment of the lateness of the confirmation was included in its submission. The identified transhipment accounts for 1% of China’s transhipments. The time differences between the date and time of when the confirmations were sent (according to the metadata in the notification) and the confirmed transhipment completion are: 1 confirmation was sent between 11 and 15 working days after the confirmed date and time of transhipment completion. A list of individual transhipments are available as an attachment to this record on the website.</td>
<td>The <em>Fu Yuan Yu</em> 9818 reported transhipment confirmation in time. The delay was caused by administrative and technical problems at the contacts. Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1).</td>
<td>Minor non-compliant (Level 1)</td>
<td>See paragraph 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, Republic of</td>
<td>CM 10-09, paragraph 5</td>
<td>requires each Contracting Party to provide confirmation of transhipment to the Secretariat within three (3) working days of any of its vessels having transhipped within the Convention Area. Analysis of the transhipment data identified non-compliance with one confirmation. The identified transhipment accounts for 1% of Korea’s transhipments. The time differences between the date and time of when the confirmations were sent (according to the metadata in the notification) and the confirmed transhipment completion are: 1 confirmation was sent between 11 and 15 working days after the confirmed date and time of transhipment completion. A list of individual transhipments are available as an attachment to this record on the website.</td>
<td>The identified case involves the Korean-flagged trawler <em>Sejong</em> and the Russian-flagged carrier vessel <em>Pamyat Illich</em>. The Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries checked with the operator regarding the discrepancy, and found that the fishing vessel did submit its transhipment notification and the completion report within the 72 hours of completion of transhipment. With this explanation, Korea finds this incident ‘Compliant.’ Attached here are the supporting documents: 1. Email message with transhipment completion report.</td>
<td>Minor non-compliant (Level 1)</td>
<td>See paragraph 86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Party Vessel Implementation summary – Secretariat Response – Contracting Party Status SCIC response

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<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>- 1 confirmation was not provided for a transhipment which was notified. A list of individual transhipments are available as an attachment to this record on the website.</td>
<td>2. Spreadsheet on the completion of transhipment report. Further Action: As we consider this case complaint, no further action is required. Preliminary Status: Compliant.</td>
<td>Minor non-compliant (Level 1)</td>
<td>See paragraphs 75 to 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>CM 10-09, paragraph 2</strong>, requires that each Contracting Party as a Flag State shall notify the Secretariat at least 72 hours in advance if any of its vessels intend to tranship within the Convention Area. Analysis of the transhipment data identified non-compliance with five notifications. The identified transhipments account for 38% of the Netherlands’ transhipments. The time differences between the date and time of when the notification was sent (according to the metadata in the notification) and the notified time are:</td>
<td>Nil response</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- 3 notifications were sent 72–68 hours before notified transhipment time.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- 1 notification was sent 63–60 hours before notified transhipment time.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- 1 notification was sent 49–40 hours before notified transhipment time.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A list of individual transhipments are available as an attachment to this record on the website.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td><strong>CM 10-09, paragraph 3</strong>, requires that each Contracting Party as a Flag State shall notify the Secretariat at least 2 hours in advance if any of its vessels intend to tranship items other than harvested marine living resources, bait or fuel within the Convention Area. Analysis of the transhipment data identified non-compliance with one notification.</td>
<td>Nil response</td>
<td>Minor non-compliant (Level 1)</td>
<td>See paragraphs 81 to 82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The identified transhipment accounts for 8% of the Netherlands’ transhipments. The time differences between the date and time of when the notification was sent (according to the metadata in the notification) and the notified time are:
- 1 notification was sent 0–1 hours after notified transhipment time.

A list of individual transshipments are available as an attachment to this record on the website.

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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>CM 10-09, paragraph 5, requires each Contracting Party to provide confirmation of transhipment to the Secretariat within three (3) working days of any of its vessels having transhipped within the Convention Area. Analysis of the transhipment data identified non-compliance with one confirmation. The identified transhipment accounts for 8% of the Netherlands’ transhipments. The time differences between the date and time of when the confirmations were sent (according to the metadata in the notification) and the confirmed transhipment completion are: • 1 confirmation was not provided for a transhipment which was notified. A list of individual transshipments are available as an attachment to this record on the website.</td>
<td>Nil response</td>
<td>Minor non-compliant (Level 1)</td>
<td>See paragraph 86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>CM 10-09, paragraph 2, requires that each Contracting Party as a Flag State shall notify the Secretariat at least 72 hours in advance if any of its vessels intend to tranship within the Convention Area. Analysis of the transhipment data identified non-compliance with 14 notifications.</td>
<td>Our investigations confirm that there have been several incidents of non-compliance with the requirement to notify the Secretariat at least 72 hours in advance of intended transhipment operations. There has been a close dialogue between Norwegian authorities and the vessels/vessel owner regarding the importance of complying with CM 10-09. Although some improvement can be seen during the current</td>
<td>Non-compliant (Level 2)</td>
<td>See paragraph 74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Party Vessel Implementation summary – Secretariat**

The identified transhipments account for 12% of Norway’s transhipments.

The time differences between the date and time of when the notification was sent (according to the metadata in the notification) and the notified time are:

- 6 notifications were sent 72–68 hours before notified transhipment time.
- 2 notifications were sent 67–64 hours before notified transhipment time.
- 3 notifications were sent 63–60 hours before notified transhipment time.
- 2 notifications were sent 59–50 hours before notified transhipment time.
- 1 notification was sent 0–24 hours after notified transhipment time.

A list of individual transhipments are available as an attachment to this record on the website.

**Response – Contracting Party**

Based on the information provided by the Secretariat, as well as our investigations, the Directorate of Fisheries has issued a formal warning to the vessels/vessel owner for non-compliance with CM 10-09.

In order to further enhance the understanding of CM 10-09 as well as other relevant CCAMLR conservation measures, Norwegian authorities will arrange a meeting with the industry before the start of the next fishing season. The relevant requirements will also be emphasised when issuing licenses to the vessels for the coming season.

Based on feedback from the masters of the vessels, we believe that there might be a need for clarifying some elements of CM 10-09, and we support the Secretariat’s initiative in CCAMLR-40/16. A recurring issue seems to be that the CCAMLR Secretariat notes time of reception of notification/confirmation, which differs from time the signal is sent from vessel.

Regarding the compliance status we consider most of the identified cases of non-compliance with CM 10-09 as minor infringements (Level 1), if assessed individually. However, as there are several incidents identified, we suggest the status non-compliant Level 2.

**Preliminary Status: Non-compliant (Level 2).**

**SCIC response**

Norway

**CM 10-09, paragraph 3,** requires that each Contracting Party as a Flag State shall notify the Secretariat at least 2 hours in advance if any of its vessels intend to tranship items other than harvested marine living resources, bait or fuel within the Convention Area.

Our investigations confirm that there have been several incidents of non-compliance with the requirement to notify the Secretariat at least 2 hours in advance of intended transhipment of items other than harvested marine living resources, bait or fuel.

Non-compliant (Level 2)

See paragraph 81
Analysis of the transhipment data identified non-compliance with six notifications.

The identified transhipments account for 4% of Norway’s transhipments.

The time differences between the date and time of when the notification was sent (according to the metadata in the notification) and the notified time are:

- 1 notification was sent 2 hours–1 hour 30 minutes before notified transhipment time.
- 3 notifications were sent 30 minutes–0 minutes before notified transhipment time.
- 1 notification was sent 0 minutes–1 hour after notified transhipment time.
- 1 notification was sent 2–6 hours after notified transhipment time.

A list of individual transhipments are available as an attachment to this record on the website.

There has been a close dialogue between Norwegian authorities and the vessels/vessel owner regarding the importance of complying with CM 10-09. Although some improvement can be seen during the current fishing season, we recognise that there is still a need for increasing the level of compliance with several paragraphs of CM 10-09.

Based on the information provided by the Secretariat, as well as our investigations, the Directorate of Fisheries has issued a formal warning to the vessels/vessel owner for non-compliance with CM 10-09.

In order to further enhance the understanding of CM 10-09 as well as other relevant CCAMLR conservation measures, Norwegian authorities will arrange a meeting with the industry before the start of the next fishing season. The relevant requirements will also be emphasised when issuing licenses to the vessels for the coming season.

Based on feedback from the masters of the vessels, we believe that there might be a need for clarifying some elements of CM 10-09, and we support the Secretariat’s initiative in CCAMLR-40/16. A recurring issue seems to be that the CCAMLR Secretariat notes time of reception of notification/confirmation, which differs from time the signal is sent from vessel.

Regarding the compliance status we consider most of the identified cases of non-compliance with CM 10-09 as minor infringements (Level 1), if assessed individually. However, as there are several incidents identified, we suggest the status non-compliant Level 2.

Preliminary Status: Non-compliant (Level 2).

**Norway**

**CM 10-09, paragraph 5,** requires each Contracting Party to provide confirmation of transhipment to the Secretariat within three (3) working days of any

Our investigations confirm that there have been some incidents of non-compliance with the requirement to notify the Secretariat at least 72 hours in advance of intended transhipment operations.

Non-compliant (Level 2) See paragraph 86.
The identified transhipments account for 4% of Norway’s transhipments. The time differences between the date and time of when the confirmations were sent (according to the metadata in the notification) and the confirmed transhipment completion are:

- 1 confirmation was sent between 16 and 20 working days after the confirmed date and time of transhipment completion.
- 4 confirmations were not provided for a transhipment which was notified.

A list of individual transhipments are available as an attachment to this record on the website.

Regarding the compliance status we consider most of the identified cases of non-compliance with CM 10-09 as minor infringements (Level 1), if assessed individually. However, as there are several incidents identified, we suggest the status non-compliant Level 2.

Preliminary Status: Non-compliant (Level 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Vessel</th>
<th>Implementation summary – Secretariat</th>
<th>Response – Contracting Party</th>
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<th>SCIC response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>CM 10-09, paragraph 8, states that no vessel may tranship within the Convention Area for which our investigations confirm that there have been two incidents of non-compliance with the CM 10-09,</td>
<td>However, according to the investigations, two of the notified transhipments were not conducted, and there seems to have been some confusion whether or not it was required to submit confirmations in these cases.</td>
<td>Non-compliant (Level 2)</td>
<td>See paragraph 88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis of the transhipment data identified non-compliance with two transhipments.

The identified transhipment accounts for 2% of Norway’s transhipments.

- 1 transhipment was confirmed but no notification was given by the Flag State or the vessel.
- 1 transhipment was notified and confirmed by the other participating Flag State but no notification was given by Norway as the Flag State or the vessel.

These transhipments were not included in the list of transhipments identified for non-compliance with CM 10-09, paragraph 2.

A list of individual transhipments are available as an attachment to this record on the website.

Preliminary Status: Non-compliant (Level 2)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>CM 10-09, paragraph 2</strong>, requires that each Contracting Party as a Flag State shall notify the Secretariat at least 72 hours in advance if any of its vessels intend to tranship within the Convention Area.</td>
<td>Nil response</td>
<td>See paragraph 78</td>
<td>See paragraph 78</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Analysis of the transhipment data identified non-compliance with four notifications.</td>
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<td>The identified transhipments account for 5% of Panama’s transhipments.</td>
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<td>The time differences between the date and time of when the notification was sent (according to the metadata in the notification) and the notified time are:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- 1 notification was sent 72–68 hours before notified transhipment time.</td>
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<td>- 2 notifications were sent 25–48 hours after notified transhipment time.</td>
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<td>- 1 notification was sent 0–24 hours after notified transhipment time.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>A list of individual transhipments are available as an attachment to this record on the website.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>CM 10-09, paragraph 3</strong>, requires that each Contracting Party as a Flag State shall notify the Secretariat at least 2 hours in advance if any of its vessels intend to tranship items other than harvested marine living resources, bait or fuel within the Convention Area.</td>
<td>Nil response</td>
<td>See paragraph 83</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Analysis of the transhipment data identified non-compliance with one notification.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The identified transhipment accounts for 1% of Panama’s transhipments.</td>
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<td>The time differences between the date and time of when the notification was sent (according to the metadata in the notification) and the notified time are:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- 1 notification was sent 72–68 hours before notified transhipment time.</td>
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</table>
### Panama

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Vessel</th>
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<th>Status</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>CM 10-09, paragraph 5, requires each Contracting Party to provide confirmation of transhipment to the Secretariat within three (3) working days of any of its vessels having transhipped within the Convention Area. Analysis of the transhipment data identified non-compliance with seven confirmations. The identified transhipments account for 9% of Panama’s transhipments. The time differences between the date and time of when the confirmations were sent (according to the metadata in the notification) and the confirmed transhipment completion are:  • 1 confirmation was sent between 3 and 4 working days after the confirmed date and time of transhipment completion.  • 6 confirmations were not provided for a transhipment which was notified and/or confirmed by the other participating Flag State. A list of individual transhipments are available as an attachment to this record on the website.</td>
<td>Nil response</td>
<td>See paragraph 86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| Panama | CM 10-09 paragraph 8, states that no vessel may tranship within the Convention Area for which prior notification, pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 above, has not been given. Analysis of the transhipment data identified non-compliance with five transhipments. The identified transhipments account for 7% of Panama’s transhipments. | Nil response | See paragraph 89 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>CM 10-09, paragraph 8</td>
<td>states that no vessel may tranship within the Convention Area for which prior notification, pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 above, has not been given.</td>
<td>Russia has thoroughly investigated the relevant incidents. The two cases identified by the Secretariat in the table as applying to Russia were probably included by mistake (between the Vanuatu and Norwegian-flagged vessels, and also between two transport vessels). In accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of CM 10-09, the competent authority directs vessels to send notifications directly to the Secretariat. During the investigation of these incidents it was established that, at the time specified, the transport vessels flying the flag of the Russian Federation were leased by the company Baltmed Reefer Service Ltd. (Greece), which essentially controlled the vessel's activities. Taking into account the fact that the Greek company was the vessel operator, a misunderstanding arose in respect of the procedure for notification of transhipments in the Convention Area. The conservation measure does not allow for the possibility of vessel operators notifying of transhipments. Nonetheless, the actual management of vessels' commercial activity, including transhipments, is done by the operator. Vessel owners are essentially limited in their ability to get involved in the commercial side of vessel's activities during the term of a lease. In cases when CM 10-09 does not account for the specifics of vessel operators' commercial activity, this needs to be corrected in terms of including the possibility of directing vessel operators to provide to the Secretariat notifications of transhipments in the Convention Area</td>
<td>See paragraph 89.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Party Vessel Implementation summary – Secretariat**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Vessel</th>
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<th>Response – Contracting Party</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>CM 10-09, <strong>paragraph 2.</strong>, requires that each Contracting Party as a Flag State shall notify the Secretariat at least 72 hours in advance if any of its vessels intend to transship within the Convention Area. Analysis of the transhipment data identified non-compliance with 12 notifications. The identified transhipments account for 18% of Russia’s transhipments. The time differences between the date and time of when the notification was sent (according to the metadata in the notification) and the notified time are:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 5 notifications were sent 72–68 hours before notified transhipment time. • 3 notifications were sent 67–64 hours before notified transhipment time. • 1 notification was sent 25–48 hours after notified transhipment time. • 1 notification was sent 97–120 hours after notified transhipment time. • 1 notification was sent 121–144 hours after notified transhipment time. • 1 notification was sent 145–168 hours after notified transhipment time. A list of individual transhipments are available as an attachment to this record on the website.</td>
<td>Further Action: If necessary, update CM 10-09 or draft clarifications in terms of the obligations of vessel operators. Preliminary Status: Need of interpretation by SCIC. Russia has thoroughly investigated the relevant incidents. The two cases identified by the Secretariat in the table as applying to Russia were probably included by mistake (between the Vanuatu and Norwegian-flagged vessels, and also between two transport vessels). In accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of CM 10-09, the competent authority directs vessels to send notifications directly to the Secretariat. During the investigation of these incidents it was established that, at the time specified, the transport vessels flying the flag of the Russian Federation were leased by the company Baltmed Reefer Service Ltd. (Greece), which essentially controlled the vessel's activities. Taking into account the fact that the Greek company was the vessel operator, a misunderstanding arose in respect of the procedure for notification of transhipments in the Convention Area. The conservation measure does not allow for the possibility of vessel operators notifying of transhipments. Nonetheless, the actual management of vessels' commercial activity, including transhipments, is done by the operator. Vessel owners are essentially limited in their ability to get involved in the commercial side of vessel's activities during the term of a lease. In cases when CM 10-09 does not account for the specifics of vessel operators' commercial activity, this needs to be corrected in terms of including the possibility of directing vessel operators to provide to the Secretariat notifications of transshipments in the Convention Area.</td>
<td>See paragraph 78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### SCIC-2021 Report – Preliminary version

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Russian Federation  | CM 10-09, paragraph 4, designates the information required to be transmitted in a notification required under paragraphs 2 or 3.  
One notification was identified where the proposed time of transhipment was not provided.  
The identified transhipment accounts for 1% of Russia’s transhipments.  
By not providing all the information required under CM 10-09, paragraph 4, the Secretariat is unable to undertake further assessment on the compliance of the transhipment activity in regard to CM 10-09, paragraphs 2 and 3.  
A list of individual transhipments are available as an attachment to this record on the website. | Russia has thoroughly investigated the relevant incidents. The two cases identified by the Secretariat in the table as applying to Russia were probably included by mistake (between the Vanuatu and Norwegian-flagged vessels, and also between two transport vessels). In accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of CM 10-09, the competent authority directs vessels to send notifications directly to the Secretariat. During the investigation of these incidents it was established that, at the time specified, the transport vessels flying the flag of the Russian Federation were leased by the company Baltmed Reefer Service Ltd. (Greece), which essentially controlled the vessel's activities. Taking into account the fact that the Greek company was the vessel operator, a misunderstanding arose in respect of the procedure for notification of transhipments in the Convention Area. The conservation measure does not allow for the possibility of vessel operators notifying of transhipments. Nonetheless, the actual management of vessels' commercial activity, including transhipments, is done by the operator. Vessel owners are essentially limited in their ability to get involved in the commercial side of vessel's activities during the term of a lease. In cases when CM 10-09 does not account for the specifics of vessel operators' commercial activity, this needs to be corrected in terms of including the possibility of directing vessel operators to provide to the Secretariat notifications of transhipments in the Convention Area. | See paragraph 84. |               |
<table>
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<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>CM 10-09, paragraph 5, requires each Contracting Party to provide confirmation of transhipment to the Secretariat within three (3) working days of any of its vessels having transhipped within the Convention Area.</td>
<td>Russia has thoroughly investigated the relevant incidents. The two cases identified by the Secretariat in the table as applying to Russia were probably included by mistake (between the Vanuatu and Norwegian-flagged vessels, and also between two transport vessels). In accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of Conservation Measure 10-09, the competent authority directs vessels to send notifications directly to the Secretariat. During the investigation of these incidents it was established that, at the time specified, the transport vessels flying the flag of the Russian Federation were leased by the company Baltmed Reefer Service Ltd. (Greece), which essentially controlled the vessel's activities. Taking into account the fact that the Greek company was the vessel operator, a misunderstanding arose in respect of the procedure for notification of transhipments in the Convention Area. The conservation measure does not allow for the possibility of vessel operators notifying of transhipments. Nonetheless, the actual management of vessels' commercial activity, including transhipments, is done by the operator. Vessel owners are essentially limited in their ability to get involved in the commercial side of vessel's activities during the term of a lease. In cases when Conservation Measure 10-09 does not account for the specifics of vessel operators' commercial activity, this needs to be corrected in terms of including the possibility of directing vessel operators to provide to the Secretariat notifications of transhipments in the Convention Area.</td>
<td>Further Action: Clarification is required in terms of the application of CM 10-09 in relation to vessel operators. Preliminary Status: Need of interpretation by SCIC.</td>
<td>See paragraph 86.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Further Action:
Clarification is required in terms of the application of CM 10-09 in relation to vessel operators.

Preliminary Status: Need of interpretation by SCIC.
<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>CM 10-09, <strong>paragraph 2</strong>, requires require that each Contracting Party as a Flag State shall notify the Secretariat at least 72 hours in advance if any of its vessels intend to tranship within the Convention Area. Analysis of the transhipment data identified non-compliance with one notification. The identified transhipment account for 8% of Ukraine’s transhipments. The time differences between the date and time of when the notification was sent (according to the metadata in the notification) and the notified time are: • 1 notification was sent 9 and 0 hours before notified transhipment time. A list of individual transhipments are available as an attachment to this record on the website.</td>
<td>Transhipment between vessels <em>Simeiz</em> and <em>Calipso</em> took place 5 February 2021 included only fish offal and cardboard packing materials. These types of materials require only 2 hours ahead notification according to CM 10-09, paragraph 3</td>
<td>Preliminary Status: Compliant</td>
<td>See paragraph 78.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>CM 10-09, <strong>paragraph 2</strong>, requires that each Contracting Party as a Flag State shall notify the Secretariat at least 72 hours in advance if any of its vessels intend to tranship within the Convention Area. Analysis of the transhipment data identified non-compliance with 15 notifications. The identified transhipment account for 18% of Vanuatu’s transhipments. The time differences between the date and time of when the notification was sent (according to the metadata in the notification) and the notified time are: • 7 notifications were sent 72–68 hours before notified transhipment time • 3 notifications were sent 67–64 hours before notified transhipment time • 3 notifications were sent 63–60 hours before notified transhipment time</td>
<td>Nil response</td>
<td>See paragraph 78</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Vanuatu

**CM 10-09, paragraph 3**, requires that each Contracting Party as a Flag State shall notify the Secretariat at least 2 hours in advance if any of its vessels intend to tranship items other than harvested marine living resources, bait or fuel within the Convention Area.

Analysis of the transhipment data identified non-compliance with four notifications.

The identified transhipments account for 5% of Vanuatu’s transhipments.

The time differences between the date and time of when the notification was sent (according to the metadata in the notification) and the notified time are:

- 1 notification was sent 2 hours–1 hour 30 minutes before notified transhipment time.
- 2 notifications were sent 1 hour 30 minutes–1 hour before notified transhipment time.
- 1 notification was sent 30 minutes–0 minutes before notified transhipment time.

A list of individual transhipments are available as an attachment to this record on the website.

Vanuatu

**CM 10-09, paragraph 5**, requires each Contracting Party to provide confirmation of transhipment to the Secretariat within three (3) working days of any of its vessels having transhipped within the Convention Area.

Analysis of the transhipment data identified non-compliance with five confirmations.

The identified transhipments account for 6% of Vanuatu’s transhipments.

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>CM 10-09, paragraph 3</td>
<td>requires that each Contracting Party as a Flag State shall notify the Secretariat at least 2 hours in advance if any of its vessels intend to tranship items other than harvested marine living resources, bait or fuel within the Convention Area. Analysis of the transhipment data identified non-compliance with four notifications. The identified transhipments account for 5% of Vanuatu’s transhipments. The time differences between the date and time of when the notification was sent (according to the metadata in the notification) and the notified time are: • 1 notification was sent 2 hours–1 hour 30 minutes before notified transhipment time. • 2 notifications were sent 1 hour 30 minutes–1 hour before notified transhipment time. • 1 notification was sent 30 minutes–0 minutes before notified transhipment time. A list of individual transhipments are available as an attachment to this record on the website.</td>
<td>Nil response</td>
<td>See paragraph 83.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Vessel</td>
<td>Implementation summary – Secretariat</td>
<td>Response – Contracting Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td></td>
<td>Five confirmations were not provided for a transhipment which was notified and/or confirmed by the other participating Flag State. A list of individual transhipments are available as an attachment to this record on the website.</td>
<td>Nil response</td>
<td></td>
<td>See paragraph 89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Simeiz</td>
<td><strong>CM 10-09, paragraph 8,</strong> states that no vessel may tranship within the Convention Area for which prior notification, pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 above, has not been given. Analysis of the transhipment data identified non-compliance with one transhipment. The identified transhipment accounts for 1% of Vanuatu’s transhipments. One transhipment was confirmed but no notification was given by the Flag State or the vessel. This transhipment was not included in the list of transhipments identified for non-compliance with CM 10-09, paragraph 2. A list of individual transhipments are available as an attachment to this record on the website.</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Argos Georgia</td>
<td><strong>CM 25-02, Annex 25-02/A, paragraph 4,</strong> states the branched streamer shall comprise of two strands of a minimum 3 mm diameter brightly coloured plastic tubing or cord. The streamer lines used on vessels <em>Simeiz</em> were built under Annex 25-02/A consist of 13 streamers from 7 meters length to 1 metre length + 0.5 metre streamer number 14 on the seaward end. This streamer usually works only in stormy weather conditions, increasing the protection area of the line from birds. Preliminary Status: Compliant.</td>
<td>The UK investigated this potential infringement. A domestic pre-season vessel inspection, undertaken on the 25 February 2021, reported compliance with all CM 25-02 requirements, as did port inspections</td>
<td></td>
<td>See paragraph 90</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Vessel</td>
<td>Implementation summary – Secretariat</td>
<td>Response – Contracting Party</td>
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<td>Comments in observer report #2045 for the trip on the United Kingdom-flagged <em>Argos Georgia</em> (25 February 2021 to 20 March 2021) report the following:</td>
<td>on the 24 February and 20 March 2021, carried out in accordance with CM 10-03.</td>
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<td>‘The tori line consisted of 12 mm diameter, 50/50 polypropylene/polyester with 12 sets of 2.3–4.3 mm luminous orange and green tubing.’</td>
<td>An assessment of fishing gear was undertaken on 19 August 2021, by the CCAMLR designated observer on board the FV <em>Argos Georgia</em>. Using a calibrator, the SISO observer reported all streamer diameters measured between 4.2 mm and 4.3 mm, consistent with requirements under CM 25-02.</td>
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<td>The observer report #2045 clearly states that the vessels streamer lines did meet the minimum CCAMLR specifications (Section 6.1 Mitigation Devices – Streamer Line Details). We therefore conclude that there was an error in the reporting of the detailed measurements of the streamer.</td>
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<td>Further Action: None.</td>
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<td>Preliminary Status: Compliant.</td>
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Conservation Measure 25-03

**CM 25-03, paragraph 3,** states the discharge of offal and discards shall be prohibited during the shooting and hauling of trawl gear.

Comments in observer report #475 for the trip on the Chilean-flagged *Antarctic Endeavour* (26 June 2020 to 22 September 2020) reported the following regarding the prohibition of discharging:

‘The only exception to this was during the setting of trawl 156. A quantity of partly processed krill (Figure 6) was discharged for approximately 3 minutes from a port side pipe outlet. The observer was informed this discharge was caused by an emergency regulator in the factory releasing excess pressure from the system.’

Regarding the discharge/discard event mentioned in the report, it was established that it happened in the course of an automatic pressure release procedure (‘over boar’), triggered by a specific episode of solidification of krill. This happens when the cooking temperature jumps suddenly from 90° to 102° C, which causes the product to solidify, thus resulting in the obstruction of the normal flow of the product (since it goes from a liquid into a solid state) and consequently causes the pressure in the system to spike. When this happens, the system releases the pressure automatically by discarding the processed produce.

All of the above confirms that it was a one-off event, resulting from a mechanical emergency procedure that is in place to prevent a catastrophic failure in the factory on board. See paragraph 90
### Conservation Measure 26-01

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Vessel</th>
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<th>SCIC response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td><em>Fu Rong Hai</em></td>
<td><strong>CM 26-01, paragraph 9</strong>, prohibits the dumping of discards south of 60°S. From 21 March 2021 to 29 May 2021, the <em>Fu Rong Hai</em> reported in their C1 data discarding south of 60°S 14 134 individuals across 17 identifiable species with a total weight of a total of 26.59 kg.</td>
<td>The <em>Fu Rong Hai</em> did not discard any by-catch during this reporting period. The reported discards in C1 data were caused by misfiling. There is an example number ‘3.45’ in row ‘Discarded Green weight (kg)’, column B in C1 data form. Therefore, the data were misleadingly filled into ‘Discarded’ rows.</td>
<td>Preliminary Status: Compliant.</td>
<td>See paragraph 90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Conservation Measure 31-02

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Vessel</th>
<th></th>
<th>Response – Contracting Party</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>SCIC response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td><em>Marigolds</em></td>
<td>In COMM CIRC 20/179 Japan reported on the sighting of the <em>Marigolds</em> on 10 December 2020 19:55 UTC in the area of Subarea 88.1 and SSRUs 882A–B (area north of 70°S) after the closure at 23:59 UTC on 9 December 2020 (COMM CIRC 20/166–SC CIRC 20/126). The vessel was operating at estimated 7 knots and then came to a stop. Nearby the <em>Shinsei Maru No. 8</em> located 3 buoys marked as <em>Marigolds</em>. Photos are provided in COMM CIRC 20/179. In COMM CIRC 20/168–SC CIRC 20/128 Ukraine notified of the delayed fishing gear retrieval, as per CM 31-02, paragraph 5. In COMM CIRC 20/169–SC CIRC 20/129 Ukraine reported on the investigation into the delayed fishing gear retrieval as per CM 31-02, paragraph 6. The report noted the adverse weather conditions lead to the breakage of the line and a search was undertaken for the missing gear which did not yield a positive result. Comments in observer report #2062_2063 from the designated observer on the <em>Shinsei Maru No. 8</em> reported the following: ‘No IUU vessels or gear were observed, although a case might be made that the Ukrainian-flagged</td>
<td>The vessel has applied all possible actions to find the fishing gear. Bad weather conditions have caused delay of search work. The actions by the vessel have been reported to the CCAMLR Secretariat and the Parties with noted circular letters. This situation has been examined additionally by the State Agency of Fisheries of Ukraine, and no signs of IUU fishing have been registered.</td>
<td>Preliminary Status: Compliant.</td>
<td>See paragraph 90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Marigolds** were fishing in the closed SSRU 881B on 10 December 2020. The vessel was found to be drifting close to its marked gear, in perfect weather, and it made no attempt to haul this while the *Shinsei Maru No.8* was present. Photographs were taken of the vessel and marked gear and are available on request.’

This event involved a potential breach of CM 31-02.

**CM 31-02, paragraph 1,** requires that following notification by the Secretariat of the closure of a fishery all vessels in the area subject to the closure notice shall remove all their fishing gear from the water by the notified closure date and time.

**Conservation Measure 32-02**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Vessel</th>
<th>Implementation summary – Secretariat</th>
<th>Response – Contracting Party</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>SCIC response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td><em>El Shaddai</em></td>
<td><strong>CM 32-02 (2012)</strong> prohibits directed fishing for toothfish in Subarea 58.7 (except for waters adjacent to Prince Edward Island).</td>
<td>Criminal charges are being instituted and a case has been registered. Further internal engagements are underway to determine harsher sanctions. Preliminary Status: Compliant.</td>
<td>See paragraph 90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In July 2020, the Secretariat was requested to provide details related to a CCAMLR toothfish tag recaptured in the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA) area in 2020. In the process of examining the tag release information, the C2 data submitted by the *El Shaddai* over the last five years was reviewed and there were 28 sets in Subarea 58.7 outside the South African exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in 2015 and 33 sets in Subarea 58.7 outside the South African EEZ in 2016.

These fishing locations in 2015 and 2016 were outside the South African EEZ and within Subarea 58.7 which was closed to fishing.

In August 2020, this information and relevant vessel monitoring system (VMS) data was provided to South Africa.
In September 2020 all relevant C2 data for the *El Shaddai* was provided to South Africa.

In COMM CIRC 21/93 South Africa reported on the investigation into the *El Shaddai*’s activities and noted that the vessel Captain and Operator were unaware that they were fishing outside the South African EEZ and systems have been developed to avoid this again in the future.

This event is considered further on the Draft IUU vessel list (COMM CIRC 21/92).

### Conservation Measure 41-01

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Vessel</th>
<th>Implementation summary – Secretariat</th>
<th>Response – Contracting Party</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>SCIC response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td><em>San Aotea II</em></td>
<td><strong>CM 41-01, Annex 41-01/C, paragraph 2 (ii)</strong>, states the tagging program shall target toothfish of all sizes in order to meet the tagging requirements. Observer report #2017 <em>San Aotea II</em> V2 for the period of 22 November 2020 to 10 February 2021 noted the following: ‘During hauling of line 48 on 3 January 2021, the captain ordered the hauling room crew to release a juvenile <em>D. mawsoni</em> (estimated to have &gt;40 cm in length) alive and untagged from the hauling room. His instruction was complied with.’ The port inspection report provided by New Zealand for the Inspection of the <em>San Aotea II</em> on 11 February 2021 in Timaru, New Zealand, noted the following: ‘Inspector’s findings: During the hauling of line 48 on 4 January 2021 (UTC) a small juvenile toothfish was released by a crew member without being tagged. This was self-reported by the vessel to the onboard observer(s) (A). Master’s statement: Regarding the above: I made a compulsive decision to release this very much alive, very small toothfish (less than 30 =cm) because I thought it was too New Zealand officials were advised by the owner of the vessel that the release of one toothfish, that had not been tagged, had occurred during the 2020/21 Ross Sea season. The release was captured on the vessel’s daily report, in the C2 data, and confirmed by the observers deployed on the vessel. The skipper of the vessel was interviewed by the inspecting officer and confirmed that the release was a one-off occurrence due to the small size of the fish. New Zealand officials investigated the issue and reviewed video footage collected by the vessel during the voyage. It was confirmed that the release of an untagged toothfish occurred on only the reported occasion. Following the investigation, the owner of the vessel was sent an official warning letter by New Zealand’s Ministry for Primary Industries. This warning letter will remain on the company’s compliance record held by the Ministry. Further Action: No further action required. Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1).</td>
<td>See paragraph 90.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
small to survive the tagging process, and far too small to kill and process.

(A) This is a breach of paragraph 34 of the AMLR permit and CM 41/01’.

The CCAMLR Tagging Protocol does not permit the release of toothfish due to any minimum or maximum size.

In acknowledging receipt of the port inspection report, a request was made by the Secretariat for further information regarding the identified breach of CM 41-01 reported in the report. No response was received.

Conservation Measure 91-05

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Korea, Republic of Hong Jin No. 701</th>
<th>CM 91-05, paragraph 24, requires Flag States to notify the Secretariat prior to entry of their fishing vessels into the MPA.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Four issues of non-compliance were identified.</td>
<td>A movement notification was provided on 9 December 2020 11:27 UTC which notified entry of the Korean-flagged Hong Jin No. 701 into the RSRMPA SRZ at 9 December 2020 10:58 UTC. The submission of the notification was made by a representative from the vessel on its behalf. The submission noted the vessel was having problems with its satellite communications equipment. Time difference: 39 minutes after entry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A movement notification was provided on 28 December 2020 23:07 UTC which notified entry of the Korean-flagged Hong Jin No. 701 into the RSRMPA SRZ at 28 December 2020 17:10 UTC. The submission of the notification was made by a representative from the vessel on its behalf. Time difference: 5 hours 07 minutes after entry.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Considering the importance of timeliness of reporting and the real-time nature, and given that an entry can happen anytime during the day, the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries and the operator arranged so that the vessel could directly report its movements to the Secretariat on their behalf. In order to ensure that communication between the vessel and the relevant authorities, including the CCAMLR Secretariat, the Hong Jin No. 701 is fitted with two units of Inmarsat devices (870-773-110-199, 870-773-111-063) and one unit of Iridium sat phone (8816-2245-3756) at the end of October 2020, prior to its departure from the port. However, from the end of November 2020, when the vessel was moving to Subarea 88.1, the data transmission and reception from the two units became unstable. As an alternative, the operator and the vessel used the sat phone and the texting function of the e-reporting system for the Korean FMC to make necessary reports (e.g. CE report, movement report, etc.) and communications with the CCAMLR Secretariat. Although the operator set up multiple communication devices as insurance to ensure seamless communication between the vessel and the land, the malfunction of the VMS units was beyond the Flag State or the operator’s control. Having said</td>
<td>See paragraph 90.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A movement notification was provided on 16 January 2021 02:22 UTC which notified entry of the Korean-flagged *Hong Jin No. 701* into the RSRMPA GPZ(i) at 16 January 2021 01:57 UTC. The submission of the notification was made by a representative from the vessel on its behalf.

Time difference: 25 minutes after entry.

A movement notification was provided on 16 January 2021 21:15 UTC which notified entry of the Korean-flagged *Hong Jin No. 701* into the RSRMPA GPZ(i) at 16 January 2021 17:37 UTC. The submission of the notification was made by a representative from the vessel on its behalf.

Time difference: 3 hours 38 minutes after entry.

so, considering the unique environmental challenges in the area, the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries advised that the fleet of the operator be fitted with advanced GX communication systems, which allow for real-time messaging and minimise communication malfunction in grey areas, in addition to the two VMS units and sat phone on the vessel. Following this instruction, the operation is upgrading the system, which will be used for the 2021/22 fishing season. Therefore, Korea finds this case technically ‘Compliant’.

At 10:46 UTC, 9 December 2020, the vessel sent an SRZ prior entry notification to the agency (vessel representative), using the texting function of the e-reporting system on the vessel as the data transmission was not smooth on the VMS units and sat phone.

At 10:58 UTC, 9 December 2020, the *Hong Jin No. 701* entered the SRZ.

At 11:10 UTC, 9 December 2020, the *Hong Jin No. 701* sent an email to the CCAMLR Secretariat notifying the entry. The master of the vessel explained that the vessel had been experiencing satellite data transmission disturbances, so the vessel initially sent the prior entry report to the representative via texting, so that the representative could forward it to the Secretariat. It took about 12 minutes for the master to call the representative and put together report.

At 11:27 UTC, 9 December 2020, the entry report was submitted to the Secretariat.

At 22:21 UTC, 9 December 2020, the vessel exited the SRZ and left for SSRU 881K. The vessel stayed in the SRZ for 10 hours and 54 minutes, during which no fishing took place. There were a number of challenges for the vessel to move to its final point due to changing patterns of floating ice that caused the vessel to change its navigating paths frequently. Adding insult to injury, the data transmission was not
smooth because of the weak signal in the area, preventing close communication from the vessel to the CCAMLR Secretariat, hence the 12 minute delay of submission from the vessel to the Secretariat. Had it not been for the data transmission problem, the vessel could have been able to submit its prior entry report 15 minutes before the entry. This was simply due to the error beyond the Flag State, operator and the vessel’s control. Therefore, Korea finds this case technically ‘Compliant’.

B.
The *Hong Jin No. 701* submitted relevant movement reports to the CCAMLR Secretariat within the 24 hour requirements and other relevant rules from 12 December 2020 when it commenced its operation in the SRZ to its arrival in SSRUs 881K and 881I on 3 January 2021. During this period, the vessel operated only in the SRZ and no fishing took place in other areas.

From 27 December to 29 December (04:00 UTC), heavy sea-ice floated into the SRZ. On 28 December (13:02 UTC), the vessel left the SRZ and moved to SSRU 881K for safety. The vessel re-entered the SRZ at 17:10 UTC the same day, after having taken refuge in SSRU 881K for 4 hours and 8 minutes. The movement happened due to the harsh ice condition that threatened the safety of the vessel and the crew, and there was no fishing operation during these movements. As this is an action taken by the vessel to ensure safety, paragraph 13 of CM 10-04 should apply that requires a movement report be submitted within 24 hours. Therefore, Korea finds this case ‘Compliant’.

C and D.
The vessel submitted its prior entry report at 20:57 UTC, 15 January 2021 before entering the RSRMPA GPZ(i).

The vessel entered the RSRMPA GPZ(i) at 01:57 UTC, 16 January 2021.
The vessel exited the RSRMPA GPZ(i) at 14:34 UTC, 16 January 2021, and entered SSRU 882A.

The vessel exited SSRU 882A at 17:37 UTC, 16 January 2021, and re-entered the RSRMPA GPZ(i).

The vessel exited the RSRMPA GPZ(i) at 22:14 UTC, 16 January 2021, after having stayed in the area for 4 hours and 37 minutes, and re-entered SSRU 882A.

As the movements of the vessel indicated in the supporting document demonstrates, the movement between the RSRMPA GPZ and SSRU 882A since its report at 20:57 UTC, 15 January 2021 happened due to changes in navigating paths while passing through the GPZ to the vessel’s intended destination avoiding floating sea ice for safety reasons. Therefore, paragraph 13 of CM 10-04 should apply that requires a movement report be submitted within 24 hours. Therefore, Korea finds this case ‘Compliant’.

For more information, please refer to the following timeline for the *Hong Jin No. 701* in the 2020/21 season:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9 December 2020</td>
<td>The vessel submitted a prior entry report for the SRZ in Subarea 88.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 December 2020</td>
<td>The vessel made its first set (it operated only in one area in the SRZ from 12 December 2020 to 3 January 2021).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 January 2021</td>
<td>The vessel exited the SRZ and moved to 70 degrees south.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 January 2021</td>
<td>The SRZ closed at 08:00 UTC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 January 2021</td>
<td>The area 70 degrees south in Subarea 88.1 closed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 January 2021</td>
<td>The vessel submitted its prior entry report for the RSRMPA GPZ(i) at 20:57 UTC.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
16 January 2021: The vessel entered the RSRMPA GPZ(i) at 01:57 UTC.

16 January 2021: The vessel exited the RSRMPA GPZ(i) at 22:14 UTC.

The vessel headed straight for the port of Monte Video for a port call without any fishing operation in Subarea 88.2.

Attached are supporting documents:
1. The movement report from SSRU 881.K to SSRU 881K SRZ.
2. The movement report for GPZ.

Further Action:
No further action required.

Preliminary Status: Compliant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
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<th>SCIC response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Tronio</td>
<td><strong>CM 91-05, paragraph 8 (iii),</strong> states toothfish shall be tagged at a rate of at least three fish per tonne green weight caught in the Special Research Zone. The <em>Tronio</em> achieved a tagging rate of 2.0 fish per tonne of green weight caught in the Special Research Zone. The vessel caught 3 tonnes of toothfish and tagged 6 <em>Dissostichus mawsoni</em>.</td>
<td>Nil response</td>
<td>See paragraph 90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| Ukraine  | Calipso  | <strong>CM 91-05, paragraph 24,</strong> requires Flag States to notify the Secretariat prior to entry of their fishing vessels into the MPA. Two issues of non-compliance were identified. A movement notification was provided on 15 December 2020 11:16 UTC which notified entry of the Ukrainian-flagged <em>Calipso</em> into the RSRMPA GPZ(iii) at 15 December 2020 07:31 UTC. Time difference: 3 hours 44 minutes after entry. A movement notification was provided on 25 December 2020 16:38 UTC which notified entry of the vessel <em>Calipso</em> into the Special Research Zone (SRZ) within the MPA. | Regarding the first issue. The vessel <em>Calipso</em> emailed notification on the intention to enter the MPA to the Secretariat prior to entering the MPA on 14 December 2020 at 07:52 UTC to <a href="mailto:ccamlr@ccamlr.org">ccamlr@ccamlr.org</a> and <a href="mailto:vms@ccamlr.org">vms@ccamlr.org</a>. Regarding the second issue, taking into account that the SRZ within the MPA was open for fishing in the 2020/21 season, the vessel operated within the framework of CM 10-04, paragraph 13, and was notified within 24 hours after crossing the SRZ border. However, taking into account CM 91-05, paragraph 24, the vessel had to notify the Secretariat before entering the SRZ. | See paragraph 90 |               |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Vessel</th>
<th>Implementation summary – Secretariat</th>
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<th>SCIC response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Nordic Prince</td>
<td>Specific instructions to the crew and the national observer were introduced. The vessel then confirmed entry into the RSRMPA SRZ via email transmission to the CCAMLR Secretariat at 06:05 UTC the same day. The confirmation of entry transmission was slightly delayed as the vessel changed over from Inmarsat (coverage ends 75 degrees south) to Iridium, which is a slower connection.</td>
<td>The UK investigated this potential infringement. The FV Nordic Prince notified its intention to enter the RSRMPA SRZ on 26 December 2020 at 01:01 UTC via an email transmission to the CCAMLR Secretariat, in accordance with CM 91-05, paragraph 24. The vessel entered the RSRMPA SRZ at 04:38 UTC. Although not required under CM 91-05, the vessel then confirmed entry into the RSRMPA SRZ via email transmission to the CCAMLR Secretariat at 06:05 UTC the same day. The confirmation of entry transmission was slightly delayed as the vessel changed over from Inmarsat (coverage ends 75 degrees south) to Iridium, which is a slower connection.</td>
<td>Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1).</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**CCAMLR System of Inspection**

| Norway        | Antarctic Endurance  | System of Inspection, paragraph V, requires a vessel to stop as soon as practicable and permit the inspector to board the vessel. A report on the attempted inspection of the Norwegian-flagged Antarctic Endurance by a Chilean authorised inspector noted the following: Once the questions had been asked, we asked the captain of the vessel if, meteorological conditions allowing, he would authorise the boarding, visit and inspection of the vessel on 23 May in the same location (Bransfield Strait). The answer was NEGATIVE, and he added the following: ‘In these times of COVID-19, we cannot accept that anyone come on board the vessel in order to ensure the safety of the crew on board.’ | In order to ensure safe operations and to protect the health of all people on board, the Norwegian krill fishing vessels have carried out very substantial efforts to prevent COVID-19 from spreading onboard. For instance, the crew is in isolation for 10 days at the port of departure, and every crew member must pass three COVID-19 detection tests before boarding the vessel. So far they have managed to avoid any outbreaks onboard fishing vessels, but having a COVID-19 outbreak onboard would pose a very dangerous situation for the health and safety of the crew. And in this particular case, it would have taken the vessel six days to reach a safe port, assuming they would have been accepted to port with an outbreak on board. Thus, the master of the vessel | See paragraph 90 |
This report was circulated to Members in COMM CIRC 21/98.

Norway

**Antarctic Sea**

| System of Inspection, paragraph V, requires a vessel to stop as soon as practicable and permit the inspector to board the vessel. A report on the attempted inspection of the Norwegian-flagged *Antarctic Sea* by a Chilean authorised inspector noted the following: Once the questions had been asked, we asked the captain of the vessel if, meteorological conditions allowing, he would authorise the boarding, visit and inspection of the vessel on 23 May in the same location (Bransfield Strait). The answer was NEGATIVE, and he added the following: ’We find ourselves in the same situation as the *Antarctic Endurance*, and we apply the same restrictions as that vessel.’ The *Antarctic Endurance* responded to the request for cooperation in an inspection with: |

In order to ensure safe operations and to protect the health of all people on board, the Norwegian krill fishing vessels have carried out very substantial efforts to prevent COVID-19 from spreading onboard. For instance, the crew is in isolation for 10 days at the port of departure, and every crew member must pass three COVID-19 detection tests before boarding the vessel. So far they have managed to avoid any outbreaks onboard fishing vessels, but having a COVID-19 outbreak onboard would pose a very dangerous situation for the health and safety of the crew. And in this particular case, it would have taken the vessel six days to reach a safe port, assuming they would have been accepted to port with an outbreak on board. Thus, the master of the vessel was worried that the safety of the crew was at risk if inspectors were allowed on board.

Preliminary Status: Non-compliant (Level 2).

See paragraph 90
In these times of COVID-19, we cannot accept that anyone come on board the vessel in order to ensure the safety of the crew on board.’

This report was circulated to Members in COMM CIRC 21/98.

The master of the *Antarctic Sea* communicated to inspectors via radio that he would have to check with company headquarters before allowing any inspections, to which the inspector answered that it was not necessary.

However, according to the CCAMLR System of Inspection, paragraph 5, a vessel shall, when given the appropriate signal, permit inspectors to board the vessel. There are no derogations from this provision, and consequently it applies also in the case of a pandemic.

All relevant CCAMLR requirements are made legally binding for Norwegian vessels through national laws and regulations and annual licenses for each vessel participating in CCAMLR fisheries. Norway takes the inspection report very seriously, and based on the information in the report, the Directorate of Fisheries has issued a formal warning to the vessel. In addition, the duties under the CCAMLR System of Inspection will also be emphasised when issuing license to the vessel for the coming season, making it clear that the risk of infectious disease is not a valid exemption from the obligation to allow inspectors onboard.

Preliminary Status: Non-compliant (Level 2).
## Non-Contracting Party IUU Vessel List 2021/22

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vessel name</th>
<th>Flag</th>
<th>IMO Number</th>
<th>Call sign</th>
<th>Nature and date of activity(ies)</th>
<th>Year listed</th>
<th>Ownership history</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amorinn</td>
<td></td>
<td>7036345</td>
<td>5VAN9</td>
<td>• Sighted 58.5.1 (11 Oct 2003) • Sighted 58.4.2 (23 Jan 2004)</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>• Infitco Ltd (Ocean Star Maritime Co.) • Seric Business S.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antony</td>
<td></td>
<td>7236634</td>
<td>PQMG</td>
<td>• Supporting IUU-listed vessels</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>• Atlanti Pez • Urgora S de RL • World Oceans Fishing SL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Warrior</td>
<td></td>
<td>7322897</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Sighted 58.5.2 (31 Jan 2004) • Sighted 58.5.1 (10 May 2006) • Sighted 58.4.1 (21 Jan 2010) • Sighted 58.4.1 (13 Feb 2011) • Towing Baiyangdian 57 (01 Apr 2012) • Sighted 58.6 (01 Jul 2012) • Sighted 58.4.2 (28 Jan 2013) • Sighted 57 (10 Mar 2013) • Fishing 58.5.1 (13 May 2013) • Sighted 57 (07 Sep 2013) • Sighted 58.4.1 (30 Mar 2014) • Sighted 57 (14 Apr 2014) • Sighted 57 (14 Dec 2014) • Hauling 5841H (07 Jan 2015) • Sighted 58.4.1 (11 Jan 2015) • Sighting 57 (26 Feb 2015)</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>• Navalmar S.A. • Meteora Development Inc • Vidal Armadores S.A. • Rajan Corporation • Rep Line Ventures S.A. • Stanley Management Inc • High Mountain Overseas S.A.</td>
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</tbody>
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(continued)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vessel name</th>
<th>Flag</th>
<th>IMO Number</th>
<th>Call sign</th>
<th>Nature and date of activity(ies)</th>
<th>Year listed</th>
<th>Ownership history</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic Wind</td>
<td>9042001</td>
<td>5IM813</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Undocumented landing Malaysia (01 Aug 2004)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>• Viarsa Fishing Company/Navalmar S.A.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Fishing 58.4.3a (22 Feb 2005)</td>
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<td>• Global Intercontinental Services</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Fishing 58.4.3a (28 Apr 2005)</td>
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<td>• Rajan Corporation</td>
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<td>• Fishing 58.4.3b (16 Dec 2005)</td>
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<td>• Redlines Ventures S.A.</td>
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<td>• Fishing 58.4.3b (01 Jul 2009)</td>
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<td>• High Mountain Overseas S.A.</td>
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<td>• Fishing 58.4.2 (27 Jan 2010)</td>
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<td>• Fishing 58.4.3b (04 Apr 2010)</td>
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<td>• Fishing 58.4.1 (13 Feb 2011)</td>
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<td>• Sighted 57 (16 May 2012)</td>
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<td>• Sighted 57 (20 Oct 2012)</td>
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<td>• Sighted 57 (28 May 2013)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>• Sighted 57 (01 Jul 2013)</td>
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<td>• Sighted 57 (13 May 2014)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Sighted 57 (14 Dec 2014)</td>
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### Contracting Party IUU Vessel List 2021/22

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Previous Names:
• *Banzare*